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ETERNAL TRUTHS IN THE THOUGHT OF SUAREZ AND OF DESCARTES

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Within the Cartesian *corpus* there are two texts which seem to indicate that there were some philosophers or theologians who maintained a doctrine wherein the eternal truths were independent of God. The first of these texts is in a letter of May 6, 1630, to Mersenne, wherein Descartes is apparently citing the texts of an unnamed adversary, who would seem to hold that the eternal truths are in themselves true and possible; being such, they are then known by God as true and possible. This position would seem to maintain that the eternal truths are in themselves true and possible, and their being so does not depend on their being known as such by God.

> In regard to the eternal truths, I say once more that they are true and possible because God knows them to be true and possible, and not on the other hand that they are known by God as true as though they were true independently of Him.[1]

In the second text Descartes takes a position in opposition to an unnamed adversary and holds that in God it is but one thing to will and to know in such wise that, given that God wills something, then He knows it; and only in this manner is a thing true. The adversary would seem to maintain that even though there were no God, nevertheless the eternal truths would be true.

> . . . in God to will and to know are but one; that is to say, that because He wills something, so He knows it and thus only is such a thing true. One should therefore not say that if there were no God, nevertheless those truths would be true.[2]

As one may readily see, the doctrine of Descartes which lies beneath these texts rules many other Cartesian positions. One such case is that there is no being whatsoever that is true or good which is in any way independent of God.[3] Likewise, that there is nothing which is simply and universally good save that which God, whose nature is

[1]". . . pour les vérités éternelles, ie dis derechef que *sunt tantum verae et possibiles, quia Deus illas veras aut possibiles cognoscit, non autem contra veras a Deo cognosci quasi independenter ab illo sint verae*" (*To Mersenne*, 5/6/1630, I. 149.21—150.2).

All citations are from the Adam and Tannery edition. Thus, the above citation from Descartes is "Letter of Descartes to Mersenne, May 6, 1630," ed. Adam and Tannery, I, 149, 1. 21 to 150, 1. 2.

[2]". . . en Dieu ce n'est qu'un de vouloir et de connoistre; de sorte que *ex hoc ipso quod aliquid velit, ideo cognoscit, et ideo tantum res est vera.* Il ne faut donc pas dire que *si Deus non esset, nihilominus istae veritates essent verae*" (*To Mersenne*, 5/6/1630, I. 149.21—150.2).

[3]*To Arnauld*, 7/29/1648, V. 223.31—224.8.

[4]*Ibid.*

[5]*Resp. 6ae*, VII. 436.15-25.

[6]*To P. Mesland*, 5/2/1644, IV. 118.

[7]*Resp. 6ae*, VII. 431.26—432.18.

[8]*Resp. 5ae*, VII. 380.7-12.

[9]*To P. Mesland*, 5/12/1644, IV. 118; cf. *Resp. 6ae*, VII, 431.26—432.18.

[10]*To Mersenne*, 5/6/1630, I. 150.2-22.

[11]*Ibid.*, 149.21—150.2. Cf. *ibid.*, 4/15/1630, I. 145.21-146.19; 5/27/1630, I. 151.1—153.3; 5/27/1638, II. 138.1-15.

[12]N. K. Smith in *Studies in Cartesian Philosophy* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1902) does not raise the question of why it is that Descartes was concerned with the eternal truths and their relation to God. Cf. esp. pp. 113-14.

[13]O. Hamelin, *Le Système de Descartes* (Paris: Alcan, 1921), esp. p. 234.

[14]Emile Boutroux, *Des Vérités éternelles chez Descartes* (Paris: Alcan, 1927).

[15]E. Bréhier, "La Création des vérités éternelles," *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger* (Paris: Alcan, 1937). The article of Beatrice K. Rome, "Created Truths and Causa Sui," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XVII (1956), 66-78, simply follows hints given in the article of Bréhier.

[16]*Descartes selon l'ordre des raisons*, I. 24, 113 sq.

[17]"La Pensée religieuse de Descartes," *Etudes de philosophie médiévale*, VI (1924), esp. 294.

[18]*The Philosophy of Descartes*, esp. pp. 43-45, 270-75.

[19]*Descartes* (London: Benn, 1934), esp. pp. 52-53.

[20]*New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes*, esp. pp. 4, 23, 177-79.

[21]E. Gilson, *La Liberté chez Descartes et la théologie* (Paris: Alcan), esp. pp. 1-210.

[22]Jean LaPorte, "La Liberté selon Descartes," *Etudes sur Descartes* (Paris: Colin, 1937), esp. pp. 101-6. In regard to this exposition of the doctrine of Descartes some difficulties arise. For example, why is it that the question of eternal truths arises at all? Why is it that there is any question of their independence from God? Why is it that Descartes even mentions the doctrine that the eternal truths would be true, even if God did not exist?

[23]P. Garin, *Thèses cartésiennes et thèses thomistes* (Desclée-de Brouwer), pp. 130-38. To evaluate this position one must consult the following texts from the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* of Suarez: *DM.* 31. 12. 43 (Vives XXVI, 297); *ibid.*, 45 (Vives XXVI, 297); *ibid.*, 46 (Vives XXVI, 298).

All citations from Suarez are from the Vives edition (Paris, 1861). Thus DM. 31. 12. 43 (Vives XXVI, 296) signifies: *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, Disputation 31, section 12, number 43; ed. Vives, XXVI, 296.

[24]Gilson, *La Liberté chez Descartes*, pp. 35-36.

wholly one and incomprehensible, wills to be good.[4] Again, ruled by the above implied doctrine of Descartes, is the position that there is no truth which is absolutely necessary,[5] even the truth that the whole is greater than any of its parts or that creatures can be made by God and then consequent to their being made are independent of God.[6] Finally, the above doctrine of Descartes makes clear from one viewpoint why the nature of God is one to such an extent that it is impossible to distinguish in Him intellect and will, even by a distinction of reason.[7]

Why is it that Descartes has adopted these positions? Why is it that he has rooted all necessity in the divine will?[8] Why is it that he has been so insistent in denying all distinctions between the divine intellect and will?[9] Why has he so stressed the divine attributes of unity and incomprehensibility?[10]

In regard to the two previously cited texts of Descartes, together with the frequent reference of Descartes to the same doctrine,[11] historians of philosophy have taken different positions. Some, like N. K. Smith,[12] Hamelin,[13] Boutroux,[14] Bréhier,[15] and Gueroult[16] have not initiated any search for this unnamed adversary nor have they raised the question as to why Descartes even discussed the eternal truths. Other historians, like Gouhier,[17] Gibson,[18] Keeling,[19] and N. K. Smith in a later work[20] adopt the solution which was proposed by Gilson in his work on *La Liberté chez Descartes et la théologie*.[21] Others again, like LaPorte[22] and Garin,[23] adopt a solution to the problem which is in opposition to that proposed by Gilson.

Since among historians of philosophy who have examined Descartes's position on the eternal truths Gilson's solution is central, his solution must be examined. In his search for the source of the texts of the unnamed adversary whom Descartes seems to be citing, Gilson concluded that the reason Descartes did not mention his adversary was either a matter of prudence or his customary manner never openly to attack an author, or else he was not considering any particular adversary. In any case, it would seem that if Descartes were considering the doctrine of a particular adversary, that adversary was not St. Thomas or any philosopher of the Schools.[24]

Since the publication of Gilson's work in 1913, P. Garin has indicated

that within Scholasticism a distinction must be made between the thought of St. Thomas and that of later Scholastics;[25] secondly, he has pointed out that it is in opposition to the Scholastic theologian, Suarez, that Descartes has established his doctrine of eternal truths.[26] Garin's work, however, leaves much to be desired in the interpretation of the texts which he handles;[27] besides, he does not explain the nature of the doctrine to which Descartes objected so frequently.[28]

First, then, what is the source of the texts which Descartes cited, and what is the nature of the doctrine of this adversary of Descartes? Secondly, what is the nature of the doctrine of Descartes in the light of his adversary's position?

Source of These Texts

These very texts which Descartes cites are found in the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* of Suarez, a work which Descartes certainly had at hand when he was replying to the objections of Arnauld.[29] If, in truth, the *Disputationes* are the source of the doctrine on eternal truths which Descartes opposed, then as early as April-May of 1630 Descartes either had the *Disputationes* in his possession or else knew its doctrine so thoroughly that he could cite it almost *verbatim*.

In the thirty-first *Disputation* Suarez maintains that propositions which affirm eternal truths are not true because they are known by God; rather, because such propositions are true are they therefore known by God. Otherwise one could not explain why God necessarily

[25]Garin, *Thèses cartésiennes*, pp. 130-38.

[26]*Ibid.*

[27]Cf. n. 23.

[28]Garin, *Thèses cartésiennes*, pp. 136-38. Compare with these remarks of Garin the doctrine of Suarez as found in *DM.* 31. 12. 43 (Vives XXVI, 296).

[29]In answering the objections of Arnauld, Descartes makes clear that the volumes of the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* of Suarez were readily available. Cf. *Resp. 4ae*, VII. 235. 5-14.

[30]". . . *neque illae enuntiationes sunt verae quia cognoscuntur a Deo, sed potius ideo cognoscuntur, quia verae sunt*, alioquin nulla reddi potest ratio cur Deus necessario cognosceret illas esse veras; nam si ab ipso Deo proveniret earum veritas, id fieret media voluntate Dei; unde non ex necessitate proveniret, sed voluntarie" (DM. 31. 12. 40 [Vives XXVI, 295]). Cf. *ibid.*, 8. 5. 5 (Vives XXV, 294).

[31]". . . necessitas huius veritatis et prima radix et origo talis connexionis, non videtur posse referri in divinum exemplar. Nam ipsummet divinum exemplar habuit hanc necessitatem representandi hominem animal rationale, nec potuit illum alterius essentiae representare quod non aliud provenit, nisi quia non potest homo esse alterius essentiae, nam, hoc ipso quod sit alterius essentiae, iam non est homo, ergo ex objecto ipso et non ex exemplari divino provenit haec necessitas" (*DM.* 31. 12. 46 [Vives XXVI, 298]).

knows them to be true. On the other hand, should their truth come from God Himself, that could only come about through the mediation of God's will; were this the case, the truth would proceed from God not necessarily but voluntarily.

> Those enunciations are not true because they are known by God, but rather they are therefore known because they are true; otherwise no reason could be proposed why God would necessarily know them to be true, for, if their truth would proceed from God Himself, that would be through the mediation of His will; hence, their truth would not proceed from necessity but willingly.[30]

In the case of propositions as, for example, "Man is a rational animal," the necessity of this truth and the ultimate source and origin of such a connection cannot, it seems, be referred to the divine exemplar. This is so according to Suarez for the reason that the divine exemplar itself necessarily represented man as a rational animal, and it could not represent him as being any other essence. The root of such a necessary representation is that man's essence is such that it cannot be any other essence; were the representation that of another essence, it would not be the representation of man's essence. Hence, the necessity of this truth—namely, that man is a rational animal—comes not from the divine exemplar but from the object itself.

> The necessity of this truth, the first root and origin of such a connection does not seem to be able to be referred to the divine exemplar, for the divine exemplar itself was under the necessity of representing man to be a rational animal, and it cannot represent him to be another kind of essence. This proceeds from no other source than that man cannot be another kind of essence, for, given that he were another kind of essence, he would not be man. Therefore, from the object itself and not from the divine exemplar proceeds this necessity.[31]

There is, thirdly, in the writings of Suarez at least one text wherein he removes from God's efficiency the truth of the object of divine knowledge. In a proposition, he says, where the copula *is* does not

signify actuality—as, for example, in the proposition "man is an animal" or "running is a movement"—the truth of such enuntiations does not depend upon an efficient cause or even upon a potential efficient cause. This is so because, first of all, all efficiency terminates at actuality from which the above propositions abstract; secondly, if one considers propositions whose truth does not depend upon an efficient or upon a potential efficient cause, truth is found to be present equally in possible and in impossible things. Thus, truth is found not only in the proposition "If man is an animal he is sensible," but also in such a proposition as "If a rock is an animal, it is sensible." The proposition, therefore, "Every animal is sensible" does not depend *per se* upon any cause which can effect an animal. Whence, granted this impossible supposition that there were no such cause, nevertheless the proposition "Every animal is sensible" would still be true; so, too, the enuntiation "A chimera is a chimera" and like propositions would be true, even though *per impossibile* there were no efficient cause.

> In another sense, however, propositions are true even if the extremes do not exist; propositions involving necessary and eternal truth are true in this sense, for since the copula "is" in this sense does not signify existence, it does not attribute to the

[32]"At vero in alio sensu propositiones sunt verae, etiamsi extrema non existant; et in eodem (sensu) sunt necessariae ac perpetuae veritatis, quia cum copula 'est' in dicto sensu non significet existentiam, non attribuit extremis actualem realitatem in seipsis, et ideo ad suam veritatem non requirit existentiam seu realitatem actualem . . . haec est perpetua veritas 'homo est animal' vel 'cursus est motus'. Atque hinc etiam fit et hae connexiones in hoc sensu non habent causam efficientem, quia omnis efficientia terminat ad actualem existentiam, a qua dictae propositiones in hoc sensu abstrahunt. . . . Imo, in hoc eodem sensu non solum non requirunt hae connexiones causam efficientem in actu, verum etiam neque in potentia videntur illam postulare, si formaliter ac praecise sistamus in earum veritate. Quod potest declarari ratione facta de propositione conditionali, cuius veritas non pendet ex causa efficiente, vel potente efficere, et ideo aeque reperitur in rebus impossibilibus et possibilibus; aeque enim vera est haec conditionalis 'si lapis est animal, est sensibilis' ac ista 'si homo est animal, est sensibilis'; ergo etiam haec propositio 'omnis animal est sensibilis' per se non pendet ex causa quae possit efficere animal. *Unde si per impossibile nulla esset talis causa, nihilominus illa enunciatio vera esset, sicut haec est vera 'chymera est chymera' vel similis*" (*DM.* 31. 12. 45 [Vives XXVI, 297]).

[33]*To Mersenne*, 5/6/1630, I. 149.21-24.

[34]*Ibid.*, 149.28—150.2.

[35]Jean Paulus, *Henri de Gand, Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Paris: Vrin, 1938).

[36]E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot* (Paris: Vrin, 1952).

extremes actual reality in themselves. Therefore, for their truth existence or actual reality is not required . . . "man is an animal" or "running is a movement" are eternal truths, and thus it comes about that such connections do not have an efficient cause because all efficiency terminates at actual existence from which such propositions abstract. . . . Moreover, such connections not only do not require an actual efficient cause, but they do not even seem to require a potentially efficient cause if we consider formally and precisely their truth. This is made evident if we consider a conditional proposition which does not depend on an efficient cause or upon a potentially efficient cause, and so truth is found equally in impossible and possible things. This proposition "if a rock is an animal, it is sensible" is equally true as this one "if a man is an animal, he is sensible." Therefore, this proposition "every animal is sensible" does not essentially depend upon any cause that can make an animal. Hence, on the impossible supposition that there were no such cause, nevertheless that proposition would be true, just a this one would be, "a chimera is a chimera" and the like.[32]

Thus, within the *corpus* of the writings of Suarez there are texts which propound the doctrine to which Descartes took exception. In opposition to the first text cited by Descartes,[33] Suarez maintains that the eternal truths are true not because they are known by God but, being in themselves true, they are known by God with necessity. Against the second text cited by Descartes,[34] Suarez holds that the eternal truths would be true even though God did not exist.

Given that there is an opposition between Suarez and Descartes in regard to the doctrine of eternal truths, then, perchance one can understand why Descartes raised the problem of the eternal truths and understand, too, his reaction and position on this question.

Doctrine of Suarez on Eternal Truths and Their Relation to God

Historians of philosophy have recognized the influence of the Avicennian theory of being upon the philosophical positions of Henry of Ghent[35] and Duns Scotus.[36] It seems, however, that the Avicennian

notion of being extends farther in the history of philosophy. The *Disputationes Metaphysicae* of Francis Suarez make amply evident the truth that the ghost of Avicenna is still haunting the Scholastics' lecture halls.

Consider, for example, the question which Suarez raises: "What is the essence of a creature prior to its production by God?" [37] As is his wont, Suarez immediately discusses the various positions which are maintained in regard to this question. First of all, Scotus maintains that prior to their creation creatures have a certain eternal being, which is a diminished being; that is to say, an objective being or a being of essence in their being of being known. This being is in creatures a result, as it were, of God's knowledge, but it is not a real being intrinsic in them; rather, this being of being known belongs to God Himself necessarily in order that He may know creatures, and hence it does not depend upon God's will or freedom.[38]

Cajetan and others misinterpret the opinion, says Suarez,[39] and hence attack Scotus for maintaining that this being, which is proper to creatures prior to their creation, is a real being and is distinct from the being of God. Were this interpretation correct, the Thomists would rightly attack Scotus for holding a doctrine which was altogether false and contrary to the principles of faith. Scotus, however, does not teach that this being of essence of the creature prior to its creation is a real being. It would be erroneous to assert that God of necessity communicates to creatures any real participated being, no matter how diminished this being may be, for it is a matter of faith that all of God's operations are in accord with the determinations of His will.[40] Hence, to answer the question "What is the essence of a creature prior to its creation by God?" Suarez maintains that he and Scotus are in agreement and that, although the essences of creatures are known by God from eternity, the essences are themselves nothing and possess no true real being prior to their reception of true real being through the free efficiency of God.[41]

If it is true that prior to their creation the essences of creatures are nothing, then the consideration of essences as essences, in themselves

[37] *DM.* 31. 2. 1 (Vives XXVI, 229).
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] *Ibid.*
[40] *Ibid.*
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] *Ibid.* (Vives XXVI, 230).
[44] *Ibid.* (Vives XXVI, 231).

indifferent to existence whether that be actual or in the intellect, which has penetrated the theological and philosophical doctrines of Henry and Scotus by reason of Avicenna's influence, has no place in the thought of Suarez. But it may be that there is more here than meets the eye at first glance. If, in truth, Suarez agrees with Scotus, how can he say that the essences of creatures prior to their production by God are nothing? Perhaps the texts need closer reading, for the objection immediately arises: "You, Suarez,[42] have asserted that the essences of creatures prior to their creation terminate God's knowledge; now, in order to terminate His knowledge, they need some being. They cannot simply be nothing."

It is true, Suarez admits, that the essences of creatures are the term, or the "that which," that divine knowledge eternally knows;[43] divine knowledge, however, in knowing the essences of creatures does not by that very fact posit them or suppose in them any real being. The sole being which true knowledge demands of its object is that it be a potential being and not at all that there be in it any real being.[44]

Prior to its creation the essence of a creature is not simple nothing; it is a potential being. What is a potential being? If it is not simply nothing and if it is nothing real, then it can only be a being of reason. But a being of reason cannot be created. What, then, is the status of a creature's essence prior to its production by God?

In order to clarify the nature of a potential being, Suarez adopts as his own the triple consideration of essence. First of all, essence can be considered as actual; as such, however, the sole actuality which an essence possesses prior to its creation is the actuality which it has in its cause. Secondly, essences can be considered as having being because they are beings of reason. As such, however, essences do not have any real being; for, as in the case of fictitious beings, the sole being which they can possess is that of being in the intellect. The third consideration of essence is the consideration of a real essence as such; it is the consideration of a possible nature which can be created and is fit to become, or capable of becoming, actual. With such essences, whose consideration abstracts from existence, sciences are concerned. The objects of sciences are real possible essences which

are abstracted from existence, be this actual existence or be it the existence which essences have solely in the intellect.[45]

Thus, the state of essences prior to their creation is that state in which essences are simply essences and as such are real possible essences which are within, and are objects of, divine science; as such they are not actual essences, nor are they mere beings of reason. They are somehow real being.[46]

In order to clarify the meaning of real being, Suarez describes it in opposition to that which is not real being. First, real being is not a being which is fabricated by the intellect, for this is properly a being of reason and can be only in an intellect. In a second sense, real being is not a being which actually exists. The essence of a creature considered in itself and prior to its creation is a real being in contrast to that which is first opposed to real being; for, whereas a fictitious being cannot become an actual being, the possible essence of a creature is real in the sense that it is a potentially actual being. This is the meaning of real being which the essences of creatures possess eternally. Real being is also used in a second sense; in this meaning real being is said of actual being.[47]

Although at first glance Suarez may seem to reject that doctrine of the being of essence as essence because he says that the essences of creatures which do not yet actually exist are nothing,[48] upon closer examination it is clear that such essences are nothing only in the sense that they possess no actual being. They are nevertheless potential or possible beings and as such are real being.[49]

This very position Scotus had maintained, for prior to any production *ad extra* of things they possess a possible being.[50]

In every creature there is a composition of act and potency; and wherever they are, potentiality or possibility is prior in the order of nature to act. Hence, potentiality in every created being is prior by nature to actuality in such wise that a being's potentiality or possibility is not nothing but is of some being according to some *esse*.

[45] *Ibid.*, 10 (Vives XXVI, 232). Cf. *In Summam Sancti Thomae*, III. c. 4 (Vives I, 206-7).
[46] *DM.* 31. 2. 10 (Vives XXVI, 232).
[47] *Ibid.*
[48] *Ibid.*, 1 (Vives XXVI, 229).
[49] *Ibid.*, 10 (Vives XXVI, 232).
[50] *In I Sent.*, 4. 43. 15 (Wadding X, 730).
[51] *Op. Ox.*, II. d. 1, q. 1, scholium.
[52] *In Summam Sancti Thomae*, III. c. 4 (Vives I, 206).
[53] *Ibid.*, 206-7.
[54] *Ibid.*, c. 6 (Vives I, 216).

Since it is not the *esse existentiae*, it is according to the *esse quidditativum*.[51]

Not only does Suarez maintain the irrelevance of actual existence for the consideration of essence as such; but even in divine cognition the knowledge of actual existence of the essence of a creature removes such knowledge from the realm of absolutely necessary knowledge. God, according to His knowledge of vision (*scientia visionis*), sees things as existing or as future in some real temporal duration and as actually exercising their existence with all its conditions. Such knowledge of vision in regard to creatures is not absolutely necessary knowledge, for it supposes the future existence of the thing.[52]

That divine knowledge of simple intelligence, however, (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*) which is abstractive in that it abstracts from the actual existence of its object, is concerned solely with creatures to whose essence actual existence is not essential. Even though creatures do not actually exist, they are known by the divine knowledge of simple intelligence quiditatively (*quidditative*) according to their essence and as these are possible. This divine knowledge, whose term is possible things or essences, is a knowledge which is absolutely necessary, for the possibility of creatures is necessary.[53]

These possible or potential real beings possess objectively within the divine knowledge of simple intelligence their own proper being of being possible; since God has such knowledge, He sees the being of possible beings with absolute necessity, and since these beings as such are not made and are not what they are by reason of the divine will, the divine will in their regard has no free act. Such possible beings are that which they are prior to the divine volition.[54]

In the thought of Suarez what is the nature of the being which is called possible or potential being or objective being? It is not an actual being, nor is it that being which can exist solely within the intellect; possible or potential being is, then, that being which does not exist actually either in an intellect or in nature. Yet, although it is not actual, it is real and it is necessarily possible or potential being. What is the ultimate nature of this being?

Suarez's clearest explanation of the ultimate nature and meaning of potential or possible thing is found in his treatment of eternal truths.

It is, indeed, this treatment of eternal truths which Descartes knew[55] and which influenced considerably his position.

First of all, let us determine the nature of the eternal truth of propositions; secondly, what is the nature of the being upon which such propositions are based? Lastly, what relation is there between such eternal and necessary beings and God?

What is the eternal truth of propositions? Propositions involving eternal truths, says Suarez, are true insofar as they are objectively in the mind of God. This is the sole manner in which these propositions are true eternally, because insofar as these are subjectively or really in God, to that extent they are not in themselves and so possess no truth proper to themselves; insofar as these propositions are eternal, it is clear that they could not exist actually in themselves. Nor could they exist actually in any other intellect save that of God. Hence, the sole eternal truth which such propositions possess is that of objective existence in the mind of God, for the only eternal and actual being is God.[56] Hence, the only being which the eternal truths can have is the being of being objective in the divine intellect. In God, then, exist eternally the eternal truths; not in him subjectively do they exist, for as such they are not in themselves;[57] such truths are in themselves and in God eternally as the beings of being objects of, and within, His intellect.

Secondly, what is the nature of this essence or being which is eternal and necessary, and is within the divine intellect with the being of being its object and in which is rooted the truth of eternal propositions? This question is in truth not different from the question which Suarez has previously raised;[58] namely, "What is the essence of a creature prior to its creation or production?" In the present instance, however, Suarez gives the clearer explanation of his position.

In the case of an eternal proposition, as, for example, "Man is a rational animal," it is not at all necessary for such a proposition to be eternally true that man's essence possesses from eternity a real and

[55]*To Mersenne*, 4/15/1630, I. 145.5-12; 5/6/1630, I. 149.21—150.2; 5/27/1630, I. 151.1—153.3; 5/27/1638, II. 138.1-15; *To P. Mesland*, 5/2/1644, IV. 118.6—119.14; *To Arnauld*, 7/29/1648, V. 223.20-224.17.

[56]*DM.* 31. 2. 8 (Vives XXVI, 231).

[57]*Ibid.*, 1 (Vives XXVI, 229).

[58]*Ibid.*

[59]*Ibid.*, 8 (Vives XXVI, 231).

[60]*Ibid.*

[61]*To Mersenne*, 5/6/1630, I. 149.24-26.

[62]*DM.* 31. 2. 8 (Vives XXVI, 231).

[63]*Ibid.*, 12. 44 (Vives XXVI, 296).

[64]*Ibid.*, 45 (Vives XXVI, 296).

actual being; such a proposition does not signify that man possesses actual being. Rather, it simply says that there is an intrinsic connection between "man" and "rational animal," and that this connection is rooted in a potential and not in an actual being.[59]

Spontaneously one objects to this reply that the knowledge which God has of the essence of man is not a knowledge that man can be a rational animal but that man's essence is necessarily a rational animal. Hence, a potential being does not suffice to explain such necessity.[60]

To this Suarez replies, and in this reply brings out some of the implications of his position. It is this explanation for the nature of this necessary and potential being that evoked from Descartes the remark that, if men understood the meaning of their words, they could never say without blasphemy some of the things which they say.[61]

There is, says Suarez, a relation of necessity between "man" and "rational animal," but this relation is not absolutely necessary according to some real and actual being; it is only a relation of absolute necessity according to possibility.[62]

This whole problem and this controversy, if we would reduce it to its ultimate origin, consist in the diverse meanings of the copula "is" which joins the extremes "man" and "rational animal." *Is* can be understood in two ways.

In the first sense, *is* signifies the real and actual conjunction of the extremes, so that the proposition "Man is a rational animal" means that man so exists in actual reality. In this sense of *is*, the truth of the proposition depends upon the actual existence of its extremes, for *is* so understood is involved in time and in real and actual duration. Moreover, in this sense of *is* the truth of the proposition is dependent upon an efficient cause, for upon it depends the actual existence of the extremes.[63]

If *is* is understood in its other meaning, then the propositions whose extremes are connected by *is* are true even though the extremes do not actually exist. It is by the employment of *is* in this sense that there are prepositions whose truth is eternal and necessary. If the sole use of *is* were that of actual existence, the only necessary and eternal truth would pertain to God, for He alone is eternally actual.[64]

In this second meaning of *is*, since it does not signify actual exist-

ence, it does not attribute to the extremes actual reality in themselves. Hence for the truth of propositions using *is* in this sense neither existence nor actual reality is required. *Is* in this sense is reducible to a hypothetical or conditional meaning. For example, if in the proposition "Man is a rational animal," *is* is understood as abstracted from time, the proposition simply means that man's nature is such that there cannot be a man who is not a rational animal.[65]

Just as this conditional proposition "If there is a man, he is a rational animal" is eternally true, or "If man runs, he moves," so, too, is it eternally true that "man is an animal" or that "running is a movement."[66]

The connection between the extremes of a proposition which employs *is* in this sense has no efficient cause, for all efficiency terminates at actual existence from which these propositions abstract.[67]

The truth of these propositions is, then, ultimately rooted in essences which are considered simply in themselves and apart from actual existence; such a consideration of essences in themselves is not a consideration of essences as they are subjectively in the divine intellect; as such, they are not in themselves. Thus, essence considered simply as essence and apart from all existence, be this actual existence or existence in an intellect, is that being upon which depend propositions expressing eternal truths.

Essences so considered, says Suarez, since they are apart from all existence, not only need no actual efficient cause in order to be that which they are; they neither need a potentially efficient cause.[68]

That this is true can be readily shown, for there are conditional propositions which, although impossible, are true; there are, besides, conditional possible propositions which are eternally true. An example of the former case is "If a stone is an animal, it is sensible," and of the latter, "If a man is an animal, he is sensible." In these two propositions and in the proposition "Every animal is sensible," essences so considered apart from all existence have no reference to efficiency. It is solely in the light of this consideration of essence that

[65]*Ibid.*
[66]*Ibid.*
[67]*Ibid.* (Vives XXVI, 297).
[68]*Ibid.*
[69]*Ibid.*
[70]*Ibid.*, 40 (Vives XXVI, 295).
[71]*Ibid.*
[72]*To Mersenne*, 5/6/1630, I. 149.21-28.
[73]"Rursus neque illae enuntiationes sunt verae quia cognoscuntur a Deo, sed potius cognoscuntur, quia verae sunt" (*DM.* 31. 12. 40 [Vives XXVI, 295]).

one can understand the meaning of the famed statement of Suarez that if *per impossibile* there were no efficient cause, nevertheless it would still be true that "every animal is sensible" or that "a chimera is a chimera." [69]

It is in essence considered as essence that the necessity of eternal truths is rooted, for those truths in which an essential predicate is said of a subject are within the divine intelligence in such wise that they cannot not be there. Thus, the truth that "animal is sensible" is a truth which is necessary simply and without any qualification or supposition.[70]

Since truths of essence prescind altogether from existence, they are not true because they have any reference to time; rather, even though God had determined not to create anything in time, still He would know such truths as true. Such truths of essences are truths which, although true of all times, in themselves abstract simply and wholly from all time.[71]

These truths are truths which are rooted in essence and its consideration as essence, and as such are not concerned with essence as it happens to be in an intellect or as it happens in things and in time. It is because of this consideration of essence that Suarez can make the affirmation which Descartes thought blasphemous.[72] Suarez affirms that propositions which concern essences as such, apart from their existence in an intellect or apart from their actual existence in things, are true; this is so not at all because they are known by God but rather because such essences, considered simply and solely in themselves, are true. Hence it is that they are known by God. "Once more those enunciations are not true because they are known by God, but rather they are known because they are true." [73]

Thirdly, what relation is there between such essences and God? It has been seen that the truth, the necessity, and the eternity of such essences lie in the consideration of essence as essence and in its necessarily being simply that which it is; this consideration of essence as such is, as has been noted, apart from all efficiency, both actual and potential, for the reason that essence as such has no relation to existence, be this actual or that which essences have solely in an intellect. Now, in the light of this were one to maintain that the truth of such

essences came from God, one would sap the necessity of the truth of essences at its very roots; for, if the truth of essences came from God, it would do so solely through the divine will. Their truth, then, would not be necessary but wholly dependent upon the divine will.

> . . . enunciations . . . therefore are known because they are true; otherwise no reason could be proposed why God would necessarily know them to be true; for if their truth would proceed from God Himself, that would be through the mediation of His will; hence, their truth would not proceed necessarily but willingly.[74]

The eternal truth of essences as such is not, then, dependent upon the divine will. Moreover, the ultimate root and origin of such essences is that of being that which they are within the intellect of God as objects known; such objects known possess the being of being objects or objective being. In regard to these objects known, the divine intellect in knowing them does not make their being, for they are not existent. In knowing them, the intellect of God (which is speculative; that is, that intellect which is ordered simply to know) supposes the truth of the object to be known. The object known by the eternal and speculative intellect of God is thus within the divine intellect that which it is in itself; such objects prescind from any future actual existence in things and even from its being in the divine intellect. Such objects or essences known are true of themselves.[75]

The doctrine of the adversary of Descartes in regard to eternal truths is that propositions involving eternal truths are true only insofar as they are within an intellect which is eternal; they are not there as identical with God, for as such they have no truth proper to themselves; rather, they are within the divine intellect as being the beings of the objects of the intellect, for only as such are they eternally themselves.

[74]". . . enuntiationes . . . ideo cognoscuntur, quia verae sunt, alioquin nulla reddi posset ratio, cur Deus necessario cognosceret illas esse veras; nam si ab ipso Deo proveniret earum veritas, id fieret media voluntate Dei, inde non ex necessitate proveniret, sed voluntarie" (*ibid.*).

[75]*Ibid.*

[76]*Ibid.*, 46 (Vives XXVI, 297). Cf. *ibid.*, 25. 1. 26 (Vives XXV, 906).

[77]". . . respectu harum enuntiationum comparatur intellectus divinus ut mere speculativus, non ut operativus; intellectus autem speculativus supponit veritatem sui objecti, non facit; igitur, huiusmodi enuntiationes . . . habent perpetuam veritatem, non solum ut sunt in divino intellectu, sed etiam secundum se, ac praescindendo ab illo" (*DM.* 31. 12. 40 [Vives XXVI, 295]).

Secondly, the nature of the being upon which such truths depend is a being or essence which is eternal and necessary according to possibility. Such essences simply are what they are, and this apart from existence either in an intellect or in actual things. Man, for example, is necessarily an animal; and this is true whether it is known or not known or whether there actually is a man who is an animal. If man happens actually to be, he is necessarily an animal. Again, such essences, since as such they have no relation to actuality or existence, do not depend upon any actual or potential efficient cause, for an efficient cause makes a being to actually be.

Lastly, since all true knowledge supposes the reality of what is known, the relation of such essences to God's intellect is that, being eternally and necessarily what they are, these essences are within the divine intellect as objects of the divine gaze and are eternally true in themselves prescinding from the divine intellect; such essences, being necessarily what they are, are in no way dependent upon the divine will

Against this last point two objections may be urged. First, one may insist that the existence which essences possess within the divine intellect from the side of the knowing subject suffices to explain their truth and necessity.[76]

This objection is of little worth, says Suarez, for in no wise can one thus explain the necessity of such truths, as, for example, that "man is a rational animal" or that "all animals are sensible" or "running is a movement." Such truths are not truths which are made; they simply are what they are, and even the gaze of the divine speculative intellect supposes the truth of its object. Of necessity these truths are true, not only as they are within the divine intellect as identical with the knowing subject; they are true in themselves, prescinding from the divine intellect.

> . . . the divine intellect is related to such enunciations as merely speculative, and not as operative; the speculative intellect, however, supposes the truth of its object and does not make it; therefore, enunciations of this kind . . . possess eternal truth, not only as they are in the divine intellect but also in themselves and prescinding from the divine intellect.[77]

One cannot say that the existence of such essences within the divine intellect from the side of the knowing subject is the ultimate origin of their necessity; rather, the exemplar within the divine intellect representing, for example, man as a rational animal, of necessity represents man as such, for such is the essence of man and it simply cannot be other. Hence, in seeking for the ultimate origin and root of the necessity and truth of essences, one must maintain that this can be found solely within the object itself and not in the divine exemplar.

> . . . the necessity of this truth (the necessary connection of non-existing extremes) and the first root and origin of such a connection does not seem to be able to be referred to the divine exemplar, for the divine exemplar itself was under the necessity of representing man to be a rational animal and it cannot represent him to be another kind of essence. This proceeds from no other source than that man cannot be another kind of essence, for, given that he were another kind of essence, he would not be man. Therefore, from the object itself and not from the divine exemplar proceeds this necessity.[78]

There is a second and last objection which must be answered. How is it that what stands within divine knowledge as the object known can be the root and the source of the necessity of science and of truth even for God if the object is in itself nothing, as Suarez has affirmed?[79]

To grasp Suarez's solution to this objection, one must understand the

[78]". . . nihilominus necessitas huius veritatis (necessaria connexio extremorum non existentium) et prima radix et origo talis connexionis, non videtur posse referri in divinum exemplar. Nam ipsummet divinum exemplar habuit hanc necessitatem representandi hominem animal rationale, nec potuit illum alterius essentiae representare, quod non aliud provenit, nisi quia non potest homo esse alterius essentiae; nam hoc ipso quod sit res alterius essentiae, iam non est homo; ergo ex objecto ipso et non ex exemplari divino provenit haec necessitas" (*ibid.*, 46 [Vives XXVI, 298]).

[79]*Ibid.* Cf. *ibid.*, 2. 1 (Vives XXVI, 229).

[80]". . . ad hoc dicendum videtur hanc connexionem nihil aliud esse quam identitatem extremorum, quae sunt in propositionibus essentialibus et affirmativis . . . omnis enim veritas propositionis affirmativae fundatur in aliqua extremorum identitate vel unitate, quae licet a nobis concipiatur complexo modo et per modum conjunctionis praedicati cum subjecto, tamen in se nihil est praeter ipsammet rei entitatem. Identitas autem cum sit proprietas entis . . . in omni ente, seu in omni statu entis cum proportione reperitur. Unde, sicut homo existens et animal in re idem sunt, ita homo possibilis seu qui objici potest scientiae aut exemplari hominis, identitatem habet cum animali proportionaliter sumpto; haec ergo identitas sufficiens est ad fundandam illam necessitatem" (*ibid.*, 12. 46 [Vives XXVI, 298]).

nature of essence as such. Take, for example, the proposition which indicates the essence of man, "Man is a rational animal." Although we conceive this essence by means of a complex act, in reality *rational animal* is identical with *man*. The truth of all propositions involving essential predication is founded, or is rooted in, the self-identity of the extremes; for unity or identity is a property of being and is found in every state of being. Thus, in the state of actual being, it is one and the self-same thing for man "to be existing" and "to be animal." The essence of man or any essence—whether it be that which is nothing actual but merely that essence which is apart from all existence and is within the divine intellect as the object known, or whether it be that same essence as actual—does not affect the essence in itself. The eternal self-identity of every essence is the root of essence's necessity and truth. This is, of course, nothing actual but is simply the essence in itself.

> To this it seems that one must say that this connection is nothing other than an identity of extremes which is in essential and affirmative propositions . . . for the whole truth of an affirmative proposition is founded in some identity or unity of the extremes, which although conceived by us in a complex manner and by the joining of a predicate with a subject, still in itself is nothing other than the very entity of the thing. Identity, being a property of being, is found proportionately in every being and in every state of being. Hence, just as existing man and animal are in reality the same, so possible man or that which can be the object of science or the exemplar of man possess proportionately an identity with animal. Therefore, this identity is sufficient for founding that necessity.[80]

Essence, considered in its own self-identity and considered simply as such and not as actually existing or as existing in the divine intellect identical with the essence of God, is that which is the origin and the root of even divine science, for it is that to which the divine knowledge is conformed. If essence is considered simply as such, it is not caused, for it does not exist. Of essences as such God has intuition and vision, and hence essence as such is not because God knows it.

Because essence is simply that which it is as such, so it is known by God; and in no other way can essences be truly known, unless first it is such as it is as essence.

> . . . by considering the divine science, only in so far as it is a simple intelligence of creatures according to their being of essence or possible being . . . thus it seems that one can without impropriety grant that the truth of that science consists in a conformity to those objects; for according to this precise consideration it is not a cause of such objects, but merely an intuition and as it were a gazing, and therefore according to this same consideration a thing is not of such an essence because as such it is known by God; on the contrary, it is known as such because it is such an essence and in no other way could it truly be known.[81]

[*To be continued*]

[81]". . . considerando vero divinam scientiam, solum prout est simplex intelligentia creaturam secundum esse essentiae seu possibile . . . sic videtur sine inconveniente posse concedi, etiam illius scientiae veritatem consistere in conformitate ad illa objecta; nam secundum hanc praecisam considerationem non est causa talium objectorum, sed mere intuitio et quasi speculatio, et ideo secundum eandem considerationem non ideo res est talis essentiae, quia talis a Deo cognoscitur, sed e converso ideo talis cognoscitur, quia talis essentia est, neque aliter potuit vere cognosci" (*ibid.*, 8. 5. 5 [Vives XXV, 294]).

ANOTHER INTERPRETATION OF *ENNEADS*, VI, 7, 32

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The relationship between faith and reason was not, as Louis-B. Geiger, O.P., has rather recently remarked, the only major speculative problem in the Middle Ages. Love, too, raised serious questions, and these with repercussions in psychology, moral philosophy and theology, literature, mysticism. For example, how many kinds of love are found on the natural level? How are these ordered to supernatural charity? Can human love be wholly unselfish and disinterested?[1]

The present paper is also concerned with love and the problems it occasions. But these arise in a pagan author who antedates the Middle Ages by several centuries and are mainly centered in the exegesis of a single text. In *Enneads*, VI, 7, 32 Plotinus (d. A. D. 270) is attempting to describe The Good. This source of beauty, life, entity, intelligence is, he says, formless because beyond all forms. He is all beings inasmuch as He is their source, and yet He is none of them because they are all subsequent to Him. He is without physical extension, since His magnitude is solely a greatness of power. He is eternal and omnipresent, but nonetheless He is neither with nor without measure, and He is without shape.[2] The controversial lines now follow.

> But if there is something desirable of which we cannot grasp the shape or form, it thereupon becomes especially desirable and lovable until the love we experience is measureless. Yes, love

here is limitless because the beloved is limitless. And, thus, love for Him is infinite and, consequently, His beauty is of another sort—beauty beyond beauty. What sort of ordinary beauty could He have Who is not a being?[3]

[1]Louis-B. Geiger, O.P., *Le problème de l'amour chez saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), p. 11.

[2]VI, 7, 32, 5 sq.

The Greek text used for *Enneads* VI is that of E. Bréhier, *Enneads*, vol. VI (Paris: Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1951). For *Enneads* I-III and IV-V it is that of P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer, *Plotini Opera*, vols. I and II (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer; Bruxelles: L'Edition Universelle, 1951 and 1959).

In my translations and paraphrases I have been helped by Bréhier's French version, which accompanies his Greek text, as well as by A. H. Armstrong's English translations of selected passages (*Plotinus* [London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1953]) and by Stephen MacKenna's English translation (*Plotinus: The Enneads* [London: Faber and Faber, 1956]). I also have had at hand the Italian translation of V. Cilento (*Plotino Enneadi* [Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1947 sq.]), as well as the German translation of Richard Harder (*Plotinus Schriften* [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1956]).

[3]VI, 7, 32, lines 24-29. The Greek text is as follows:

Καὶ μήν ὅτου ἂν ποθεινοῦ ὄντος μήτε σχῆμα μήτε μορφὴν ἔχῃς λαβεῖν, ποθεινότατον καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἂν ἄμετρος εἴη· οὗ γὰρ ὥρισται ἐνταῦθα ὁ ἔρως, ὅτι μηδὲ τὸ ἐρώμενον, ἀλλ' ἄπειρος ἂν εἴη ὁ τούτου ἔρως κτλ.

Translators handle the text with some slight variations. S. MacKenna's version is somewhat elliptical: "So with shape: granted beauty, the absence of shape or form to be grasped is but enhancement of desire and love; the love will be limitless as the object is, an infinite love" (*Plotinus: The Enneads*, p. 586). E. Bréhier also omits one clause: "Or, le désirable dont on ne peut saisir ni la figure ni la forme, est le plus désirable et le plus aimable; l'amour qu'on a pour lui est sans mesure; oui, l'amour est ici sans limites, puisque l'aimé est lui-même sans limites (*Enneads*, p. 104). Marsilius Ficinus is more complete: "Proinde res illa desiderabilis, cujus neque figuram neque formam accipere ullam potest, summopere desideranda est et amanda, immensusque illius est amor. Neque enim hic finitus est amor, quando neque amatum quidem ipsum est finitum: sed amor hujus est infinitus" (*Plotini Enneades*, ed. F. Creuzer and G. H. Moser [Paris: Ambroise Firmin Didot, 1885], p. 500). V. Cilento's is also good: "In verità, se v'è qualcosa di bramato di cui tu non puoi cogliere nè figura nè forma, si tratterà sempre di quel supremo oggetto di brama e di affascinante amore! E in questo caso l'Eros è immensurabile; tant'è vero che anche sulla terra l'Eros non conosce limiti, poichè non li conosce neppure l'oggetto amato; anzi l'Eros del Bene è infinito a tal punto che anche la sua bellezza è di tutt'altra specie . . ." (*Plotino Enneadi*, p. 365).

[4]W. Norris Clarke, S.J., "Infinity in Plotinus: a Reply," *Gregorianum* LX (1959), 91.

[5]Such a statement is easily found in a medieval theologian such as Thomas Aquinas, who finds in it the basic difference between knowledge and appetition—knowledge terminates (from one point of view) in the intellect, but appetition in the thing loved. For example, see *Summa Theologiae*, I, 16, 1 resp. (Leonine manual ed., p. 93): "Hoc autem distat inter appetitum et intellectum sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente; appetitus autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam. Et sic terminus appetitus, quod est bonum, est in re appetibili; sed terminus cognitionis, quod est verum, est in ipso intellectu." According to my present knowledge, the statement is rarely if ever explicitly made by Plotinus.

What is meant, then, by a "limitless love"? by an "infinite love"? by a "limitless beloved"? And such questions become somewhat more urgent in the light of a recent and, in my opinion, erroneous interpretation. After having stated that VI, 7, 32 combines "in a single sweep infinity of supra-formal nonbeing, of power, and of intrinsic lovableness as infinite Goodness and Super-Beauty," W. Norris Clarke, S.J., then adds:

> The end of the latter text alone, in fact, should be enough to clinch the case of the intrinsic infinity [of] the One: 'Love of Him is measureless . . . because that which is loved is unlimited and, thus, the love itself in infinite.' Since love always goes to its object as it is intrinsically in itself, and not to a mere extrinsic denomination, an infinite love drawn by an infinite object surely presupposes that the infinity of the beloved resides in its own inner reality as it is in itself.[4]

Reduced to its main propositions, Clarke's argumentation runs as follows:

> The object loved is infinite;
> But one always loves an object as it is intrinsically in itself;
> Therefore, the object loved is infinite intrinsically—"in its own inner reality as it is in itself."

Obviously, the middle statement is at the heart of his argument.[5] Change it and his conclusion too must be changed.

And change it we must, for what Plotinus himself says is quite different—"Love here is limitless *because the beloved is limitless.* And, thus, love for Him is infinite."[6] The point he explicitly makes is that love takes its characteristics from what is loved. Since the beloved is somehow infinite, love, too, is similarly infinite. The result is that Plotinus's own line of thought differs from Clarke's in its middle statement and, thereby, in its conclusion also:

> The object loved is somehow infinite;

[6]The italics are, of course, my addition. For other translations, see *supra*, note 3.

But the object loved characterizes the love;
Hence, the love in question also is somehow infinite.

In order, then, to understand what is meant by "infinite love," one must first investigate how the beloved (here, The Good) is infinite. Consequently, let us turn again to *Enneads*, VI, 7, 32 so as to discover how Plotinus predicates infinity of The Good.

The Context

First of all, what is the context in which that chapter fits? This can best be answered by tracing the current of thought in previous chapters.

That movement of thought is initiated and then guided by a series of questions which Plotinus puts to himself.[7] The first of these concerns how various items which are essentially linked with matter (for example, powers of sensation, horse, dog and other animals, plants, the four elements and, in general, what is inferior and without intelligence) can be found in the Intelligence, which manifestly is genuinely immaterial.[8] This inquiry eventually leads our author to ask whence the Intelligence comes.[9] Its source, he replies, is The Good, whom it contemplates and from whom it receives power to produce and fill itself with goods.[10] In the course of his response he directs his attention also to The Good Himself. In the sensible universe the sun brings it about that things both come to be and are seen, although it transcends such things and does not itself have mere physical vision. So too There God is at once the cause of entity and the light illumining known and knower, while He Himself is above entity and intellection.[11] Again, He is above what He gives and, consequently, He is above life, intelligence, shape, form [12]—in a word, He is supreme and absolutely transcendent.

But, next, how does the Intelligence, together with its contents,

[7]VI, 7 is a good example of Plotinus's digressive and circuitous style of writing. See E. Bréhier, *Enneads*, "Le style de Plotin," I, xxxvi-xxxix, A H. Armstrong, *Plotinus*, p. 15.
[8]VI, 7, chs. 1-11.
[9]*Ibid.*, ch. 12.
[10]*Ibid.*, chs. 13-15.
[11]*Ibid.*, ch. 16, line 22 sq.
[12]*Ibid.*, ch. 17.
[13]*Ibid.*, ch. 18 sq.
[14]*Ibid.*, ch. 21 sq.
[15]*Ibid.*, ch. 22, line 5 sq.
[16]*Ibid.*, chs. 24-25.
[17]*Ibid.*, ch. 27.
[18]*Ibid.*, ch. 30.
[19]*Ibid.*, line 18 sq.

become good, desirable, lovable?[13] By reason of the color, glow, warmth, light steaming down from The Good.[14]

> Each thing has its own particular nature but it only becomes desirable when the Good colors it, giving a kind of grace to the things desired and inspiring passion in those who desire them. Then the soul, receiving into itself an outflow from Thence, is moved and dances wildly and is all stung with longing and becomes love. Before this it is not moved even towards Intelligence for all its beauty: the beauty of Intelligence is ineffective till it catches a light from the Good, and the soul by itself lies flat and is completely ineffective and is not stirred by the presence of Intelligence. But when a kind of warmth from Thence comes upon it, it gains strength and wakes and is truly winged; and though it is moved with passion for that which lies close by it, yet all the same it rises higher, to something greater which it seems to remember. And as long as there is anything higher than that which is present to it, it naturally goes on upwards, lifted by the Giver of its love. It rises above Intelligence but cannot go on above the Good, for there is nothing above.[15]

The series of questions which then follows provides the setting into which Chapter 32 is set. What makes The Good be *good*? Is He such because desirable, or is it the other way round?[16] In general, what constitutes goodness? Is something good because it is suited to another? Because it is what the lower needs?[17] Does pleasure enter into a good life?[18] In answering this last, Plotinus begins the discussion of which the chapter in question is a part.

A good life does involve pleasure, he explains, provided the term is used to describe the joy resulting from living intelligently, for no manner of life is more pleasant, lovable, desirable. In the words of Plato, such a life is a mixture of truth, proportion, and beauty. Especially according to this latter does one come upon what is good.[19] Since everything has beauty and light from what is prior, even an individual soul strains upward in joyous contemplation so as to see The Good, enticed as it is by the love He communicates. Under the sway of that love, it attends not to earthly beauties, transient and

soiled as they are, but seeks only its beloved. Rising to the intelligible realm, everywhere it sees beings which are beautiful and true. Itself filled with the life of being, it becomes a genuine being and achieves true knowledge by its very presence.[20]

CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO

But where, Plotinus continues in the opening lines of chapter thirty-two, is He who has bestowed such beauty and life and entity upon all the varied forms and beings There? [Line 5:] He is not Himself any one form (*morphē*) or power There, nor is He all of them taken together. Rather, He must be above all such powers and forms. As the source, He is formless (*to aneidon*), and yet not as lacking form but as that from which all intellectual forms have come. Whatever comes into being, necessarily becomes some thing or other and has its own proper form. But who could produce Him whom no one has ever produced? Accordingly, He is none of those beings and yet is all of them—none because they are all subsequent to Him, all because they have come from Him.

[Line 14:] Moreover, what sort of physical magnitude would He have who is all-powerful? He is infinite, and if infinite, he has no such magnitude, which is found only in what is subsequent to Him and which, as its cause, He Himself ought not have. His greatness consists in the fact that nothing is more powerful or even has equal power. For what does He have in which beings who are in no way the same as He, could equal? [Line 21:] He is eternal and omnipresent, but nonetheless He is neither with nor without measure, and He is without shape (*schema*).

The crucial lines now occur:

> [Line 24:] But if there is something desirable of which one cannot grasp the shape or form, it thereupon becomes especially desirable and lovable until the love we experience is measureless. Yes, love here is limitless because the beloved is limitless. And, thus, love for Him is infinite, so that His beauty is of another sort—beauty beyond beauty. What sort of ordinary beauty could He have Who is not a being?[21]

[20] *Ibid.*, ch. 31, line 1 sq.

[21] For the Greek text, see *supra*, note 3.

[Line 30:] Rather, since He is lovable, He produces beauty—He is its productive force, its culmination, its cause, its source and term. He makes His products beautiful, and beauty here both does and does not involve form—of itself it is not form, although that which participates it and thus becomes beautiful has a form.

Meaning of Controversial Lines?

Briefly stated, our aim has been to isolate what Plotinus intends by describing the beloved as infinite in chapter thirty-two so as to understand what he means by similarly characterizing love. As a means towards that goal, we have located that chapter within its context by charting the development of thought in previous chapters. We have also paraphrased that chapter itself and have translated lines twenty-four to thirty. Now we are ready to face the question: What does our author signify there by depicting The Good and our love for Him as infinite?

When seen in context, those enigmatic lines are rather readily intelligible. Previous chapters have sung an almost constant refrain—The Good is the principle of absolutely everything. He is the source of Intelligence, of entity, of love, of beauty. He is also the source of each soul, who seeks Him through the love He Himself has bestowed. Invited and urged by this love to attain Him, a soul rises above earthly beauties and, then, above even intelligible beauties. But where is that Source? Still higher, and the description given Him in chapter thirty-two obviously is mainly negative: we are told what He is not rather than what He is. He is not any one definite form or power because He is above all such forms and powers. As their source and in His transcendency, then, He is formless. Although He can be said to be all beings inasmuch as all have come from Him, nonetheless He actually is none of them, for being comes after Him. Because of His infinite power, He rises above mere physical extension and size, and His eternity and omnipresence set Him beyond both the absence and presence of measure. He is without figure or shape. In short, because of His absolute transcendency He is infinite, and the term is the negation in Him of the definite forms, shapes, figures, being,

properties suited only to lower levels of reality. He is not merely this or that entity but much more. But because of the love He plants in them, those beings love Him. Now love takes on the characteristics of the object loved. Therefore, their love for Him is similarly infinite. It is not aimed at this or that parcel of being but at the supreme Existent Himself. It is not tied down to this or that manner of expression. It is not restricted to this or that size but capable of indefinite growth and enrichment. It is developed only when the soul puts away the determined forms and contours of inferior entities and achieves a status of spiritual and personal indetermination to match that of the Beloved.[22] He is immense; so too is love for Him. He is incomprehensible, and likewise is our love. He is transcendent; our love is transcendent. He is indescribable; so too is our love.

When predicated of love, then, infinity assumes basically the same meaning as when applied to The One. In this latter application it apparently is mainly negative—the denial in Him of the manner of being proper only to inferior existents and of its concomitant determination. It locates Him above the intelligible and sensible universes. Accordingly, such infinity seems coterminous with nonbeing (= hyperbeing) and transcendency. And since love clothes itself with whatever sort of infinity the beloved wears, our love of Him is infinite, too, by transcending the restricted, definite, limited sort of love mere creatures call forth in us so that we love Him immeasurably, ineffably, endlessly.

Corroboration in Chapter Thirty-three

The last question we must face is whether or not such infinity of nonbeing also implies that The One Himself is infinite in His own unique reality. But before taking up that question, let us note that our interpretation of chapter thirty-two is directly corroborated by the lines immediately subsequent to it, where love and lovableness are similarly aligned with transcendence of form and being. Love grows as the soul in her knowing-processes becomes increasingly independent

[22]On this point see VI, 7, 34, 1 sq.; VI, 9, 3, 1 sq.; VI, 9, 7, 8 sq.; VI, 9, 8 33 sq. For an interpretation of those texts, see L. Sweeney, S.J., "Infinity in Plotinus," *Gregorianum*, XXXVIII (1957), p. 529 and note 40.

[23]VI, 7, 33, line 10 sq.

[24]*Ibid.*, lines 30-38.

of forms, and what is best and most desirable is that which is entirely formless. Let us briefly paraphrase that passage.[23]

The soul, Plotinus there explains, desires the supremely Beautiful and yet is unable to account for its desire. Reason says, though, that He is supremely real, since what is best and most desirable is also what is entirely formless. Accordingly, if you show the soul a form, she ascends to seek the source of that form. Reason also states that whatever has a form and, even, is a form is entirely restricted. Wherefore, such an item cannot be reality in its fullest or be self-sufficient or be subsistent beauty. Rather, it is a mere composite. Such a thing must, of course, be beautiful. And yet That Which is supremely real and is beyond beauty must not be restricted. Consequently, He must not be fashioned from a form or be a form. Therefore, while beauty resides within the sphere of the Intelligence, what is Primary and First is without form.

The experience of lovers underwrites this point, for love begins only when the soul rises beyond the sense level to some genuine intellectual knowledge. But even here she should not rest but should ascend beyond intelligible forms until eventually she arrives at the Formless, which is the source of all forms.

> This [the Formless] produces form when matter comes to It. Matter is necessarily farthest away from It, since it has no form derived from itself, not even of the lowest kind. So then, if it is not matter that is lovable but the being which is informed by form, and if the form in matter comes from soul and soul is more form and more lovable, and Intelligence is more form than soul and more lovable still, we must assume that the Primary Nature of beauty is without form.[24]

As one ascends the hierarchy of existents, then, items become increasingly lovable until one comes upon Him who transcends all forms and entities and thereby is most worthy (indeed, infinitely worthy) of love because of His very transcendency. And a soul experiences greater and greater love as she increasingly puts aside definite forms until she achieves infinite love when confronted with Him who is entirely without form or entity and thereby is infinitely lovable.

Here, as in chapter thirty-two, love is infinite because the beloved is infinite; and infinity in each case is aligned with formlessness, nonbeing, transcendency.

Divine Reality itself Infinite?

Finally we must ask whether such an infinity of nonbeing also

[25]For a text representative of this tradition, see Aristotle, *Physics*, III, ch. 6, 207a8sq.: "A quantity is infinite if it is such that we can always take a part outside what has already been taken. On the other hand, what has nothing outside it is complete and whole. . . . For thus we define the whole—that from which nothing is wanting. . . . [But] that from which something is absent and outside, however small that may be, is not 'all.' 'Whole' and 'complete' are either quite identical or closely akin. Nothing is complete [= perfect] which has no end, and the end is a limit'. (τέλειον δ'οὐδὲν μὴ ἔχον τέλος· τὸ δὲ τέλος πέρας).

Also see J. Owens, *Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Med. Studies, 1951), p. 306, n. 19: "Perfect Being for the Greeks meant limitation and finitude. . . . For the Greeks, imperfection was implied by infinity."

[26]See V, 1, 7, 19-26; V, 5, 6, 1-37; VI, 7, 17, 12-18; VI, 8, 9, 37 sq.

[27]For example, see III, 9, 7, 4 sq.; V, 6, chs. 1-6; III, 8, 9, 43 sq.; VI, 7, chs. 37 and 38; V, 3, 11, 19 sq.

[28]See VI, 9, 3, 39 sq.: "Since the nature of The One produces all things, It is none of them. It is not a thing or quality or quantity or intellect or soul; It is not in motion or at rest, in place or in time, but exists in Itself, a unique Form or, rather, It is formless, existing before all form, before motion, before rest, for these belong to being and make it multiple." See also III, 9, 7, 1 sq.

[29]See VI, 9, 3, 49 sq.: "Even when we call The One 'the Cause,' we are not predicating any attribute of It but of ourselves, because we received something from It while It exists in Itself. Strictly speaking, we ought not to apply any terms at all to It. . . ."

V, 5, 6, 1 sq.: "But if all things are in that which is generated from the One [that is, in the Intelligence], which of the things in it are you going to say that the One is? Since It is none of them, it can only be said to be beyond them. Now since such realities are beings and being, the One is beyond being. This phrase, 'beyond being,' does not mean that the One is some 'this' (for it makes no positive statement about It) and is not Its name, but only implies that the One is *not* a 'this' or 'that.' That expression does not at all encompass the One, for to seek to encompass Its immense nature is ridiculous." Later in the same passage: "Therefore, The One is ineffable. 'One' simply denies any multiplicity. In the beginning of our search for the First Principle, 'One' indicates that which is most simple, but finally even this 'One' is to be dropped as an adequate term for that nature which must be seen to be reached and known" (*ibid.*, line 30 sq.).

V, 5, 13, 1 sq.: Precisely because He is the absolute Good, the Supreme can contain nothing and, thus, is void of all but itself. If we predicate any attribute of Him—whether "entity" or "intelligence" or "beauty"—, we thereby deprive Him of being absolute goodness. Rather, deny everything of Him, affirm nothing of Him, and be content to say, "He exists," without testifying to attributes which He does not have. Let us attach to Him nothing which is later and lower, for He moves above all that order, is the source of all those but is actually none of them. Etc. See also VI, 9, 4, 11-16; V, 3, chs. 13-14.

[30]Such infinity also shows up in chapter thirty-two (see VI, 7, 32, 14-21),

indicates the Good Himself to be infinite. Is it also an attribute of the divine reality itself? Theoretically at least, it need not be but perhaps might only locate God above His products without necessarily stating whether that divine nature itself was *apeiron*. If this was the case, that supreme Reality could itself involve its own brand of determination, and thus Plotinus would remain within the long-standing Greek tradition which makes determination and limit synonymous with perfection.[25] Or his God might transcend finitude and infinity alike. If He is above both being and form,[26] above intellect and life,[27] above rest and motion,[28] why could He not also be beyond both infinity and finiteness, which would be reserved as apt epithets only for His products? In this interpretation He would be truly ineffable, genuinely indescribable.[29]

Actually, though, the Greek author seemingly intends such an infinity of nonbeing to at least imply that The One is Himself infinite. This implication becomes apparent when one contrasts his *apeiria* of nonentity with that of power. Why is The Good infinite in power? In one interpretation, because He is the source of effects which are infinite—the infinitely numerous existents deploying throughout the endless series of world-cycles. Here, apparently, infinity properly and directly characterizes those products and is not immediately and intrinsically predicated of God Himself but rather through extrinsic denomination with reference to them.[30]

If one contrasts this latter sort of infinity with the former, then obviously the former is directly and intrinsically predicated of God Himself inasmuch as it does not involve such extrinsic denomination. When we say, "The One is infinite as transcending the intelligible and sensible universe," The One is the subject of the proposition, infinity is His direct predicate, and thus we have actually said that The One Himself is infinite.

"But," someone may object, "the statement, 'The One Himself is infinite,' can also be interpreted as, 'The One is infinite in being and reality' or 'The very reality itself of The One is infinite.' This interpretation is not necessarily what Plotinus intends at all since such infinity is the very denial of being, as one can easily see by momentarily turning to the sensible universe. Here matter, too, is *aoriston* or

apeiron because it is without the determination arising from form and entity. Accordingly, infinity is predicated of matter directly and intrinsically and not through extrinsic denomination. Matter is the subject, infinity is its direct predicate. In this sense one can accurately say that matter itself is infinite. But the fact that matter itself can be classified as infinite does not at all mean that matter is infinite in being and reality, because infinity here is the very absence of being, the very denial of reality. Rather, 'Matter itself is infinite' simply states the fact that matter itself is below being and form. So too, 'The One Himself is infinite' simply states the fact that The One Himself is above being and form as found on lower levels. Such infinity is merely relational: it locates God with reference to His products. It is purely negative: God is *not* similar in any way to them (thereby revealing the absence of all analogy between God and His effects in the Plotinian *Weltanschauung*). It does not imply His unique reality to be infinite."

although here Plotinus uses it chiefly to establish that The One is incorporeal: He has no physical magnitude or extension because His power is infinite. For other texts, see VI, 9, 6, 1-13; II, 4, 15, 17-26. Also see L. Sweeney, S.J., "Infinity in Plotinus," pp. 713-732, especially 713-20 and 731.

Of course, if The One Himself is infinite and if His power is identical with His reality, then infinity could also be an intrinsic attribute of the divine power itself. But one should note that even such an intrinsic infinity of power can be coupled with an infinity through extrinsic denomination in reference to its infinite effects, as Thomas Aquinas makes clear. Divine power is infinite, he explains, not only as identical with God's essence but also with respect to its effects: "Sed sciendum quod quamvis potentia habeat infinitatem ex essentia, tamen ex hoc ipso quod comparatur ad ea quorum est principium, recipit quemdam modum infinitatis quem essentia non habet. Etc." (*De Potentia*, 1, 2, resp. [Marietti ed., p. 11d]). Perhaps one reason why Aquinas does not allow one to move from power to essence (that is, to argue that God's essence is infinite because His power is infinite) is precisely this second kind of infinity. (See *In I Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1, a. 1 solutio [Mandonnet ed., p. 1003]).

Apparently Aristotle predicates infinity of the power of his First Movers solely through extrinsic denomination since the only sort of infinity he elaborates is that of quantity, which can be directly predicated only of quantitative items. See L. Sweeney, S.J., "Aristotle's Infinity of Quantity," *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, LVIII (Nov., 1960), 504-528. One also finds infinity predicated of divine power in John Damascene (see L. Sweeney, S.J., "John Damascene and Divine Infinity," *New Scholasticism*, XXXV [1961]), 76-106.

[31]For texts on matter, see L. Sweeney, S.J., "Infinity in Plotinus," pp. 522-527. Also see Cleto Carbonara, *La Filosofia di Plotino* (2nd ed.; Napoli: Libreria Scientifica Editrice, 1954), "Il Problema della Materia," pp. 17-54; Jean Trouillard, *La Procession Plotinienne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France), "La matière," pp. 14-20; E. Bréhier, *Philosophy of Plotinus*, chap. ix ("The Sensible World and Matter"), pp.164-81.

What can one answer to that lengthy objection? A reply is suggested in its own final words—"His unique reality." The very fact that God is genuinely and positively real places Him at the opposite pole of the universe from matter, which is a mere negation, nonbeing, unreality. Accordingly, the parallel set up between His infinity and that of matter collapses. When matter, because of its lack of form and entity, is classified as infinite directly and not through mere extrinsic denomination, such *apeiria* cannot establish that the very reality or being of matter is infinite since it has no reality or being. Paradoxically, its only reality is unreality, nonentity, privation.[31] The case of God is manifestly different since He is supremely real, albeit in an indescribable, unfathomable, and completely unique manner. Consequently, when one affirms that He is infinite as transcending the being and form proper to lower levels, this affirmation is made through intrinsic denomination and, accordingly, is equivalent to saying, "God Himself is infinite," which in turn implies, "His very reality is infinite," because, unlike matter, He is the supreme and primal Reality.

Perhaps the precise nature and validity of this implication will be clearer if we compare Plotinus with Thomas Aquinas. The former's theory is much less complete and consistent, metaphysically is less adequately grounded, and yet draws rather near to the Dominican's position in one important area.

Aquinas's is a universe of being, which is analogously common to God and to creatures. In it form and actuation cause determination wherever found and, accordingly, matter can be considered as infinite because of itself it is without any form or act. But, unlike Plotinus, he holds that matter and potency are genuinely real as actually existing components in material things and, thereby, also are determinants by limiting the forms and acts which they receive and which are themselves determinants by conferring perfection on their recipients. Now each creature is a being and God is Being. But each creature is a *finite* being because a composite of act(s) received and determined by potency, whereas God is *infinite* Being because an entirely subsistent Act and so without any recipient potency. Perfect *Being* because He is subsistent Actuality, God is *infinite* Being as free from the limiting determination of matter and all potency. Here infinity, although a

negation and an absence, belongs properly and directly to the divine being itself because what is negated is within the very sphere of being: matter and potency belong, in their own way, to being as truly as do form and act, since matter and potency, too, are genuinely real in their own way. And just as their presence in an existent has actual repercussions on his very being by making it limited, so their absence in an Existent has genuine repercussions on His very being, which thereby is unlimited. And this being is Thomas's God, whose infinity thus permeates His very entity.[32]

Of course Plotinus's universe is greatly different, since primacy is not given to being but to unity[33] and analogy of being between God and creatures is replaced by absolute ontic dissimilarity. Moreover, and as we have already indicated, matter is not genuinely real—it is a privation, a darkness, a mere shadow beneath form, upon which it causes no actual determination or limitation. Form consequently is the sole source of internal determination for an entity, and its absence alone entails a corresponding state of indetermination. But, oddly enough, the relationship which exists between his God and the sort of form and being found in lower levels of reality appears similar to that in the Thomistic cosmos between the divine being and matter or potency. In each case there is a freedom from determination and limitation by God's rising above the determining factors in lower existents. According to the Christian author, the divine being is without any matter or any other sort of potentiality and, automatically, is without any limiting determination. According to the pagan Greek, The Good transcends all form and being proper to His products and,

[32]See *In I Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1, a. 1 solutio (Mandonnet edition, p. 1003); *Summa Theologiae*, I, 7, articles 1 and 2 in their entirety; (Leonine manual edition, p. 32 sq.); *ibid.*, III, 10, 3 ad 1, p. 87.

[33]See L. Sweeney, S.J., "Basic Principles of Plotinus's Philosophy," *Gregorianum*, XLII (1961).

[34]My current willingness to grant that infinity is an attribute of The One Himself is a change from my earlier interpretation on this point (see my two articles, "Infinity in Plotinus, especially p. 531 and pp. 731-2, and "Plotinus Revisited," *ibid.*, XL [1959], 328-9). Accordingly, I am now in agreement on this controversial point with Clarke (see "Infinity in Plotinus: A Reply," pp. 75-98), although my reasons for concluding that The One's reality is itself implied to be infinite are somewhat different from his.

Of my two articles on Plotinus just mentioned, one should retain the general descriptions of the two kinds of infinity—in the first it is linked with nonbeing and in the second it is predicated of divine power. But one should now add by way of correction and of complement that the first sort also implies that the very reality of The Good is infinite.

thereby, is also without the limitation, determination, imperfection He would encounter if He too had such form and being. For, as we have just seen, in Plotinus's world there is a single source of determination, and this is not matter, which is unreal and nonbeing, but only form. And God's products are perfect because of the forms and being they possess. But such being is proper only to those products and would be an imperfection and limitation in God. He transcends any such form or entity and, simultaneously, rises above their brand of determination, with the result that the divine reality is itself infinite and infinitely perfect as free from all such determination and limitation.

Conclusions

Aquinas elaborated a metaphysics of being, in which both form and matter, both act and potency, are real and are genuine determinants. Plotinus's metaphysics is much different, since matter and potency are neither real nor actual determining factors. Nevertheless, form with reference to The One plays a role similar to that which matter and potency enact with respect to Aquinas's God and apparently The One, too, is genuinely infinite in His very reality.[34] Such an infinity can be seen implied whenever Plotinus speaks of Him as infinite because transcendent, formless, nonbeing.

If this interpretation is accurate, both sorts of infinity are contained in *Enneads* VI, 7, 32, where God is explicitly described as infinite because of His rising above the intelligible and sensible universes and, thus, is simultaneously implied to be infinite in His own unique reality. Accordingly, in order to establish that Plotinus there intends God Himself to be infinite, one need only point to his explicit statements concerning God's *apeiria* through transcendency and nonentity. There is no need to rely upon the extraneous argumentation that since one always loves an object as it is intrinsically in itself, God must be infinite intrinsically because He is the infinite object of our love.

A New Ecclesiastical Review, "Augustinianum," has appeared this spring. Edited by the Professors of the International Augustinian College, Rome, who are Hermits of St. Augustine, this journal will appear three times a year and deal with all branches of ecclesiastical sciences: Sacred Scripture, theology, canon law, Church history, patrology, philosophy, and so on. The articles will be written in Latin and the chief Western languages, and contributors will not be limited to the Augustinian order. Each volume will consist of about two hundred pages and will contain, beside four or so articles, book reviews, bulletins, and notes and discussions on ecclesiastical problems. The yearly subscription rate will be five dollars. Those interested in subscribing should write to: *Ephemerides "Augustinianum,"* via S. Uffizio, 25, Rome.

The Editors of "Pensamiento," the well-known Spanish philosophical journal, inaugurated, in 1956, a series of biennial meetings, of the members of the Jesuit philosophical faculties in Spain. The aim of these *Conversaciones Pensamiento*, as they have been appropriately denominated, is, of course, to stimulate the philosophical thinking of the participants through a living exchange of ideas. The first of these *Conversaciones* was held at the Pontifical University of Comillas; the second, at the Faculty of Philosophy of Alcalá de Henares. At the third, held in April, 1960, in Barcelona, the original scope of the meetings was broadened inasmuch as, besides a good representation from the faculties of philosophy of the Society of Jesus in Spain, there were present, on invitation, an almost equal number of professors from other faculties, including several prominent philosophers from other countries. At this latest gathering, to which the Faculty of S. Cugat del Vallés played host, there were four sessions. Each of these began with a detailed exposition of a particular topic. Afterwards two commentators spoke, clarifying certain points and making various observations calculated to stimulate the general discussion, which then followed. The main speakers with the topics they respectively treated were as follows: Reverend Jesús Muñoz, "The Sources of Our Knowledge of the First Principles in Their Transcendent and Absolute Validity"; Reverend José Gómez Caffarena, "The Metaphysical Implications of the Human Act of Affirmation"; Reverend Franco Días de Cerio, "Foundations for a Philosophy of History"; and Reverend Luis Martínez Gómez, "Philosophical Dogmatism in Present-Day Scholasticism and the Limits of a Wholesome

(Continued on p. 322.)

THE CERTITUDE OF PROVIDENCE IN ST. THOMAS

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Unmistakable differences in St. Thomas's statements concerning the causal certitude of providence have baffled many of his commentators. In the *Sentences* there appears the somewhat disconcerting statement to the effect that events may occur not intended by providence.[1] In the *De Veritate* this is restated in even more precise terms. Here St. Thomas distinguishes between necessary and contingent causes. In the case of the former, he affirms causal certitude (*certitudo ordinis*) both with respect to general results and with respect to each particular effect. In the case of the latter he admits causal certitude with respect to general results but denies it with respect to each particular effect. Moreover, he distinguishes the causal certitude of providence from that of predestination: the salvation of the predestined is causally certain not only in general but also in each individual case. However, this causal certainty does not apply to each particular act but only to the eventual salvation of each of the elect.[2] In the *Contra Gentiles* St. Thomas abandons all these restrictions and affirms that the causal certitude of providence applies to all without exception or distinction,[3] a position which is upheld and even further elaborated in the *Pars Prima*.[4]

Various explanations have been proposed to reconcile these divergent statements. Cajetan, presuming the change to be self-evident, would urge the junking of the *De Veritate* opinion and the acceptance of the later doctrine. But he made no effort to explain why and how the change took place.[5] Toletus, severely criticizing Cajetan's position, would categorically deny any change in St. Thomas's teaching on the ground that the absolute and universal infallibility attributed to divine providence in the *Contra Gentiles* and *Summa Theologiae* is attributed,

not to divine providence as such, but to divine providence *joined to divine knowledge*. Thus, for Toletus, divine providence was restricted, in the *Sentences* and *De Veritate*, to the mere ordering of means and was therefore not always infallible as regards the actual attainment of the end, because, in these early works, St. Thomas was considering divine providence as such—that is, as *pura providentia*—and not as joined to divine knowledge.[6] Sylvester of Ferrara offered a somewhat different solution. According to him the Angelic Doctor in his early works was speaking of divine providence in general (*communis ratio providentiae*); and since there are two particular modes by which divine providence ordains things to their ends—some to the actual attainment of both means and end, others to the actual possession only of the means by which things can conveniently but not infallibly attain the end—the Angelic Doctor could not very well attribute to the *communis ratio providentiae* any infallibility except the minimum infallibility common to both particular modes; that is, an infallibility which extended only to the actual possession of the means sufficient to attain the end. The unqualified assertions, therefore, in the *Contra Gentiles* and *Summa Theologiae* to the effect that whatever is ordained by divine providence will infallibly take place, must be modified, in his opinion, by the qualifying words, "according to the particular mode by which it is ordained by divine providence." Hence, if something is ordained to the actual possession of the means only and not of the end, it will infallibly obtain possession only of the means. But if it is ordained also to the actual attainment of the end, as in the case of the predestined, then it will infallibly attain also that end.[7]

Among other things, one difficulty with the two above explanations is that they seem to be completely a-priori; they are not (nor do they claim to be) based on any relevant or at least concomitant texts in

[1]*In I Sent.*, d. 40, q. 1, a. 2.
[2]*De Ver.*, q. 6, aa. 1, 3.
[3]*CG*, III, cap. 94.
[4]*ST*, I, q. 22, a. 2; a. 4, ad 2-3.
[5]Cf. Thomas de Vio Cajetanus, *In Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 22, a. 1.
[6]Cf. Franciscus Toletus, *In Sum. Theol. S. Thomae Aquinatis Enarratio*, ed. Josephus Paria (Turin: Marietti, 1869-70), I, 273.
[7]Cf. Franciscus de Sylvestris Ferrariensis, *In Cont. Gent.*, III, c. 94.
[8]Cf. C. R. Billuart, *Summa Summae S. Thomae*, ed. F. Ecalle (Paris: Vives, 1884), I, 146-49, 214-17; Emmanuel Gisquière, *Deus Dominus* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1950), II, 448; Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Deo Uno* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1938), pp. 417-31, 494-95, 504-6; Ludovicus Billot, *De Deo Uno et Trino* (ed. 7a; Rome: Gregorian Univ. Press, 1935), pp. 362-74. Gisquière, though not a commentator, discussed the above problem in his manual.

St. Thomas. Another objection against them is that they ignore the all-too-evident fact that the points of doctrine clearly taught in the *Sentences* and *De Veritate* can nowhere be found in St. Thomas's later works. On the contrary, as the present article will attempt to show, texts in these later works abound which tend to explain why the *De Veritate* distinctions between the infallibility of divine providence and that of divine predestination (or divine knowledge or divine will, for that matter) have been dropped.

But the explanation of Billuart, Gisquière, and Garrigou-Lagrange and, probably, also Billot, it seems cannot be said to lack altogether any basis in the texts.[8] For they all attempt to explain the *Sentences* and *De Veritate* statements concerning the limited infallibility of divine providence by appealing to the celebrated distinction between *voluntas consequens* and *antecedens*, which St. Thomas appears to have made in *In I Sent.*, d. 47, q. 1, aa. 1-3; *De Ver.*, q. 23, aa. 2-3; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1; and *Supplementum*, q. 16, a. 2, ad 5 and q. 72, a. 3. In their opinion, divine providence, insofar as it presupposes *voluntas antecedens*, is infallible only with regard to the ordering of the means; but insofar as it presupposes *voluntas consequens*, it is infallible with regard to both ordering of means and attainment of end.

But even this explanation is not exempt from defects. First of all, like Toletus's and Sylvester's explanations, it altogether ignores the fact that the opinions expressed in the *Sentences* and *De Veritate* are no longer evident in St. Thomas's later works, whereas, as will be pointed out, texts in these later works seem to indicate why those early opinions have not been restated there, although there was more than enough occasion to do so. Secondly, this explanation is itself deeply involved in many uncertainties—for example, whether *voluntas antecedens* is a *voluntas proprie* or *beneplaciti* or *signi*; what it means precisely; how it is connected with the actual order; whether it is always fulfilled; and so on—so that it would seem far better to avoid this explanation altogether, especially if some other simpler and more explicitly Thomist explanation, more in accordance with the texts, could be obtained. Thirdly, even if this explanation accurately reflects the mind of St. Thomas in the *Sentences* and *De Veritate*, it

does not follow that it also accurately reflects the mind of the Angelic Doctor in the *Contra Gentiles* and in some other later works where the notion of *voluntas antecedens* does not appear, or in the *Summa Theologiae* where the notion is given only incidental references. Besides, even in the early works, no connection was explicitly made between divine providence and *voluntas antecedens*.

All the above explanations, therefore, whatever value they may have in explaining and justifying St. Thomas's initial insights, cannot account for the absence of those initial insights in his later works—particularly in those places where he treats of exactly the same matter—or for the presence, in those later works, of new insights which, if studied together with those initial insights in their totality as well as in the order of their appearance, cannot fail to give the over-all impression that those initial insights, which have much occupied and exercised the minds and ingenuity of his commentators, have been purposely dropped to give way to a more comprehensive and synthetic notion of divine providence. The fundamental defect in the above interpretations, then, is one of method. Their proponents do not seem to have actually followed, through St. Thomas's successive works, the variations and developments in the providence tracts as well as in the other relevant and concomitant treatises. And without this method, the findings and conclusions of the present paper, it is feared, would not emerge.

In the epilogue to his recent monumental work concerning human understanding, Father Lonergan wrote a brief description of this method:

> To penetrate to the mind of a medieval thinker is to go beyond his words and phrases. It is to effect an advance in depth that is proportionate to the broadening influence of historical research. It is to grasp questions as once they were grasped. It is to take the *Opera Omnia* of such a writer as St. Thomas Aquinas and to follow through successive works the variations and developments of his views. It is to study the concomitance of such variations

[9]Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1957), pp. 747-48. A more detailed description by the same author may be found in "The Concept of *Verbum* in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas: V. *Imago Dei*," *Theological Studies*, X (1949), 388-93.

[10]See *In I Sent.*, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1.

[11]See *ibid.*, d. 40, q. 1, a. 2.

[12]See *ibid.*

and developments and to arrive at a grasp of their motives and causes. It is to discover for oneself that the intellect of Aquinas, more rapidly on some points, more slowly on others, reached a position of dynamic equilibrium without ever ceasing to drive towards fuller and more nuanced synthesis, without ever halting complacently in some finished mental edifice, as though his mind had become dull, or his brain exhausted, or his judgment had lapsed into the error of those that forget man to be potency in the realm of intelligence.[9]

It is precisely one such "concomitance," overlooked for the most part by Aquinas's commentators, that the following pages will examine and trace through his successive works to determine some of the reasons for his divergent statements on the causal certitude of providence. This concomitance is the series of parallel passages running from the *Sentences* to the *Summa Theologiae*, in the course of which St. Thomas gradually developed his notion of divine providence.

In the *Sentences*, God is likened to an architect-builder. Just as there is providence in the architect-builder insofar as he selects the means best suited to bring about the realization of his end and anticipates and removes the impediments to such a realization, so in God there is providence insofar as He furnishes things with what will conserve their order and prevent disorder. From this comparison it would seem that the function of divine providence is simply to furnish whatever promotes, and to remove whatever hinders, the attainment of the end.[10] In his distinction between providence and predestination St. Thomas seems to have further restricted the implications of this comparison. From his notion of divine providence at this period, he explicitly excludes any note by which the divine "art" of governing is conceived as causally related to the execution of the *opus* itself, as well as any implication of a divine foreknowledge of the actual course and outcome of this divine ordering.[11] It is not surprising, therefore, to see him affirming at this period the possibility of some events occurring which are not intended by providence.[12]

In the *De Veritate* he shifts his attention to another aspect of

providence; namely, its analogy with human prudence. The comparison with the architect-builder is conspicuously absent. Providence is no longer described as an art (*quaedam ars*) or even as including in its significance the notion of disposition; it is distinguished from both art and disposition.[13] The significance of this change of viewpoint lies in the fact that prudence is concerned not about things to be made or produced (*factibilia*) but about acts to be performed (*operabilia*).

This shift from art to prudence is both fortunate and unfortunate. It is fortunate inasmuch as it opens up a new aspect of divine providence, which is rich in spiritual implications. However, in another sense, it is unfortunate since it tends to perpetuate the limitations imposed in the *Sentences* on the causal certitude of providence. For prudence looks to the right ordering of already existing things to the end, while art considers the successful completion of the artifact exactly as it has been planned by the artist. Hence, in the subsequent *quaestio* on predestination St. Thomas distinguishes providence from predestination by pointing out that providence looks only to the ordering of things to the end while predestination looks also to the result or outcome of the ordering.[14] Consequently, he attributed a more limited certitude to providence than to predestination. On the one hand he affirmed that the certitude of providence was not a certitude of knowledge (*certitudo cognitionis*) but a certitude of

[13]See *De Ver.*, q. 5, a. 1, and ad 9.

[14]"Providentia, ergo, ordinem in finem respicit tantum. . . . Sed praedestinatio respicit etiam exitum vel eventum ordinis. . . . Sicut igitur se habet providentia ad impositionem ordinis, ita se habet praedestinatio ad ordinis exitum vel eventum" (*ibid.*, q. 6, a. 1).

[15]See *De Ver.*, q. 6, a. 3. For the manner in which God infallibly attains the effects of predestination without destroying man's freedom, as taught by St. Thomas at this period, cf. *ibid.*, q. 22, a. 8.

[16]In connection with these variations and divergences, it may be noted also that the Angelic Doctor in certain passages seems to think that the universality and immediacy of divine providence cannot be established from reason alone. Sertillanges and Rousselot cite two such passages. See A. D. Sertillanges, O.P., *La Philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Montaigne, 1940), I, 232; Pierre Rousselot, S.J., *L'Intellectualisme de saint Thomas* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1936), pp. 154-56. The first of these passages (*De Ver.*, q. 14, a. 9, ad 8) is clear enough. The second and much later one (*ST*, II-II, q. 1, a. 8, ad 1), however, no longer explicitly refers to the universality and immediacy of divine providence but simply to certain questions about providence which the Angelic Doctor left unspecified. It may be interesting to find out the significance, if any, of these two passages with respect to St. Thomas's evolving understanding of providence.

[17]See, for example, *CG*, II, cap. 24; III, cap. 64, 66, 76, 94, 109.

[18]See *ibid.*, II, cap. 24.

ordering (*certitudo ordinis*). It was not a certitude of knowledge, since St. Thomas's notion of providence at this time did not include divine knowledge of the outcome. It was a certitude of ordering—that is, of the ordering of cause to effect—from a twofold aspect, general and particular: particular, inasmuch as certain particular secondary causes, such as the heavenly spheres, were then thought by St. Thomas to be necessarily ordered to the particular effects and ends to which divine providence ordained them; general, inasmuch as all secondary causes, whether necessary or contingent, could not produce effects or fail in attaining their particular ends without these effects and these failures being themselves ordained to the general end of providence.

On the other hand, the Angelic Doctor considered the certitude of predestination to be a certitude both of knowledge and of ordering. It was a certitude of knowledge because predestination as such included divine knowledge of the predestined soul's attainment of salvation. It was a certitude of ordering, not because the particular secondary cause, the predestined soul, was necessarily ordered to the acts or series of acts by which it would be actually saved, but because in the actual circumstances and aids that divine election and predilection had gratuitously arranged and prepared for it, it would actually, freely, and ultimately attain the end to which it had been predestined.[15] Thus, even with regard to predestination, St. Thomas denied causal certitude with respect to the acts of each predestined soul.[16]

In the *Contra Gentiles* the analogy with art reappears, and this quite frequently.[17] The analogy with prudence, on the other hand, falls into disuse. One reason for this reversal to the analogy with art is no doubt the fact, noted down by St. Thomas himself, that things are referred to God as *factibilia* rather than as *operabilia*.[18] There is nothing in God, no act or means, which needs to be ordained to His "end," since God's essence, existence, and operation are one and the same, and He is His own "end." God, therefore, is not made more perfect because of His providence, but rather His creatures participate in His goodness through His providence. Since creatures participate in His goodness also insofar as they exist, the effects of divine

providence must include not only the operation and perfecting of creatures but also their existence.[19]

Aquinas's study of the causality of divine providence with regard to the existence, nature, conditions, operations, and effects of all secondary causes,[20] as well as his conclusion that the facts of evil, contingence, free will, chance, and secondary causes in the universe, is not incompatible with a universal and immediate divine providence[21] but even fits in perfectly with it, provided the basis for his further conclusion that divine providence is the ultimate *per se* cause of the whole world and history of created being. The certitude of divine providence, consequently, is not only with regard to the mere ordering of some necessary causes to their immediate ends or of all causes and effects, both contingent and necessary, to the general end, but also with regard to every existence, effect, operation, and causality in the universe, either contingent or necessary, intended by secondary agents or not intended, free or not free. For divine providence controls not only the occurrence but also the mode of occurrence of each thing. Providence controls each occurrence because it controls all the possible influences and conditions under which each occurrence takes place. It controls the mode of each occurrence because the causality of divine providence, unlike the causality of particular and secondary causes, extends to each being insofar as it is being;[22] and since God cannot cause except what He wills and ordains to Himself as end, or will and ordain except what He knows, and since what He knows and wills and ordains He knows and wills and ordains eternally, the certitude of divine foreknowledge of the outcome cannot be excluded from divine providence.[23]

To sum up: in the *Contra Gentiles*, divine providence is conceived as an eternal act of ordination of the divine wisdom, intellect, and will by which the whole world order and history of created being are realized exactly as they have been understood, affirmed, willed, and ordained in that eternal act. Thus, its certitude is both a certitude of

[19]St. Thomas attributed the creation of things in being also to an ordination of divine wisdom and intellect. "Et sic patet quod Deus produxit res in esse ordinando eas" (*CG*, II, cap. 24). Again: "Nihil igitur Deus facere potest quin sub ordine suae providentiae cadat: sicut non potest aliquid facere quod ejus operationi non subdatur" (*ibid.*, III, cap. 98).

[20]See *ibid.*, cap. 65-70.

[21]Cf. *ibid.*, cap. 71-92.

[22]See *ibid.*, cap. 94-100; esp. cap. 95.

[23]See *ibid.*, cap. 95 (*fine*); cap. 98.

[24]See *ibid.*, cap. 163.

knowledge and a certitude of ordering or causality; and its certitude of ordering is not only the absolute and real but very limited certitude in the order of first acts or specifications (that is, of forms, essences, and essential ordinations in things) but also, and most especially, the conditioned certitude in the order of second acts or actualizations (that is, of existences, operations, actions and occurrences) whose conditions, though they may appear to have "just happened" to be fulfilled, have in reality been known, intended, and willed to be fulfilled by an all-knowing, all-ordaining, eternal, and immutable divine providence.

This evolution in St. Thomas's notion of providence and its certitude would logically call for a corresponding revision of his teaching regarding the relation between providence and predestination. In the very short chapter which he devotes to the question of predestination in the *Contra Gentiles*, he not only does not distinguish the certitude of providence from that of predestination but proves the kind of certitude involved in the latter from the kind of certitude in the former, on the ground that predestination is nothing but a part (*pars quaedam*) of providence. Just as divine providence, he says, does not remove contingency from the universe, so neither does divine predestination destroy man's freedom. Further, just as there is nothing which can be the cause of divine providence, so neither can the merits of man be the cause of divine predestination.[24]

Though in the *De Potentia* St. Thomas does not treat the subject of divine providence *ex professo*, yet his observations about divine art may throw some light on his notion of divine providence at this period. For him the causality of divine art is not restricted to the mere production of things or to their conservation in being or even to the established uniform course of natural things in the universe. It extends to the whole world of finite reality as it was, is, and will be. The form therefore of the universe as it was freely, eternally, determinately, and immutably understood by God in Himself, affirmed and willed by Him as a *finis operationis* and ordained by Him to Himself as to the ultimate end, is the divine art, whose unfolding was merely begun with the creation of the universe and to which is due every ordination in the universe. Nature, therefore, which is the cause of the ordination only

in natural things and in more or less uniform particular effects and occurrences which are in accord with it, is only part of the divine art. For the eternal ordination of divine providence, says St. Thomas, may call for effects and occurrences taking place apart from the causality of some or all particular causes.[25] Thus, St. Thomas confirms in the *De Potentia* the new doctrine on providence and its certitude first expounded in the *Contra Gentiles.*

But it is in the *Summa Theologiae* that St. Thomas seems to have made the first adequate synthesis of the precise roles of the two analogies with art and prudence in the proper understanding of divine providence, as well as of his notion of divine providence itself. How he has arrived at this is what the present section will attempt to explain.

In the first place, he distinguishes prudence from art:

> Now it has been stated above that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring ability for a good work; while some habits are virtues, not only through conferring ability for good work but also through conferring the use. But art considers the mere ability for good work, since it does not regard the appetite, whereas prudence confers not only ability for a good work, but also the use, for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude of the appetite.
>
> The reason for this difference is that art is the *right reason of things to be made*, whereas prudence is *the right reason of things to be done.* Now *making* and *doing* differ . . . in that *making* is an action passing into external matter, e.g., to build, to saw, and so forth; whereas *doing* is an action abiding in the agent, e.g., to see, to will, and the like. Accordingly, prudence stands in the same relation to such human actions, consisting in the use of power and habits, as art does to external makings; since each is the perfect reason about the things with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in

[25]Cf. *De Pot.*, q. 1, a. 3, ad 8; q. 3, aa. 16-17; q. 6, a. 1, ad 10, 12, 14, 19; q. 6, a. 6.

[26]*ST*, I-II, q. 57, a. 4 (English Dominican translation, ed. Anton C. Pegis).

[27]See *ibid.*, ad 1; also II-II, q. 47, a. 5.

[28]See *ibid.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 1, ad 3; a. 8.

[29]See *ibid.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 4, ad 3.

[30]See *ibid.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 2, ad 3.

speculative matters depend on the principles from which reason argues. . . . Now in human acts ends are what principles are in speculative matters. . . . Consequently, it is requisite for prudence . . . that man be well disposed with regard to ends; and this depends on the rectitude of this appetite. Therefore, for prudence there is need of moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite. On the other hand the good of things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good of the artificial things themselves, and hence art does not presuppose the rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that more praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence to sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art.—Accordingly, it is evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art.[26]

Besides this primary distinction, St. Thomas gives other differences which are, more or less, nothing but further precisions and clarifications of the above. Thus, he points out that art deals *only* with the making of things external to man, while prudence is concerned with human acts alone;[27] that the perfection of art consists in the act of judgment which pertains to the speculative intellect, while the perfection of prudence lies in its principal act, the act of ordaining which is an act of the practical intellect;[28] that in prudence there is counsel about matters regarding man's entire life and the last end of human life, while in art there is counsel about matters concerning the end proper to the art alone;[29] that prudence must always be practical, since it includes not only the consideration of the right reason (*recta ratio*), or the universal principles governing human acts, but also the application of this right reason to the human act itself, whereas art may not always be practical, since there may also be an art in the "making of speculative things" (*in quantum facit speculativa*), which kind of art may therefore be considered speculative.[30]

In the second place, St. Thomas admits some similarity between art and prudence which make these two intellectual virtues more complementary to each other than contrary, more interdependent than

independent. For both are virtues perfecting the practical intellect and dealing with the contingent and so are distinct from the other intellectual virtues,[31] which perfect the speculative intellect and which deal with the necessary. Though the perfection of prudence lies in the third act and that of art in the second, nevertheless, being virtues perfective of the practical intellect, they both include all three acts of counsel (*consiliari*), judgment (*judicare*), and ordination (*praecipere*). Again, prudence is not only with respect to the individual's good (*bonum proprium*), but there can also be another species of prudence which deals with the common good (*bonum commune*). Thus, besides the prudence by which one governs oneself, there is also the other species of prudence by which one governs others.[32] Again, prudence as well as art presupposes a knowledge of the singulars, since prudence deals not only with the consideration of universal principles but also and principally with their application to human acts and therefore with the singular necessarily connected with those acts.[33] Finally, the example which St. Thomas has often used to explain divine providence—namely, the military—involves both art and prudence: art, insofar as it is concerned with the production and disposition of things, and prudence insofar as it deals with the ordination of human acts to the common good.[34]

In the third place, St. Thomas is now more concerned with understanding divine providence in itself (that is, in the light of what he affirmed of divine knowledge and will) than with merely seeking isolated points of similarity and dissimilarity between divine and human providence. Hence, in trying to arrive at a proper analogical notion of divine providence, he does not start with its analogy with art or prudence but with his already worked out notions of divine causality, divine intellect, and divine will. Divine causality of all good argues to divine causality of the greatest good; namely, the ordination of the whole world of finite being to its ultimate end, which is the divine goodness. This divine causality, in turn, points to the preexistence of the said ordination in its divine Cause; and since God's

[31]These are *sapientia*, *intellectus* (in the sense of the habit, not of the faculty) and *scientia*.

[32]Cf. *ibid.*, q. 47, aa. 10-11; q. 48, a. 1; q. 50, aa. 1-4.

[33]Cf. *ibid.*, q. 47, a. 3.

[34]Cf. *ibid.*, q. 50, a. 4, ad 1.

[35]See *ibid.*, I, q. 22, a. 1.

[36]See *ibid.*; also II-II, q. 49, a. 6.

[37]See *ibid.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 3, ad 2.

[38]See *ibid.*, q. 49, a. 6.

being is His understanding, this ordination of all things to their ultimate end must exist in God in an intelligible manner—that is, as understood by and in divine understanding itself, or, to put it more clearly but less accurately, as a divine idea, exemplar, or *ratio*. It is this eternal divine notion of all things, insofar as they are ordained and to be ordained to their ultimate end, that St. Thomas considers to be the aspect in the divine reality which corresponds to our proper analogical notion of divine providence. It is that which divine understanding, in understanding itself, principally understands when it understands and causes the whole universe of finite being. Only when St. Thomas begins to show the appropriateness of calling this all-embracing divine notion "providence" does he introduce the concept of human prudence.[35] For human providence is the right ordination of means to end, which ordination is the principal part of human prudence. Furthermore, human providence is of two kinds: that by which a person ordains his acts well to the end of life and that by which a person ordains the acts of his subjects to a common end. It is only in this second way that prudence and human providence may be suitably compared to God's providence, for God is His own "end" and consequently there is nothing in Him that can be ordained to an end.[36] Besides, human providence also includes knowledge of the singulars about which human acts are performed, although the imperfectness of that knowledge involves human providence in uncertainty as to the outcome,[37] and the narrow field of human causality restricts human providence to the future and the contingent, for the past and the present have acquired, simply by their being actual, a necessity which puts them beyond the control of human providence.[38] Evidently the use of the analogy with prudence as a starting point requires so many restrictions, distinctions, and qualifications before one can derive from it a true analogical concept of divine providence, that St. Thomas apparently thought it better to consider divine providence in the light of the divine intellect, will, and causality, and to introduce the analogy with prudence only as a justification for the suitableness of the name. For this reason, though he makes use again of this analogy in the *Summa Theologiae*, he does not revert to the

De Veritate conclusion about the uncertainty of divine providence with regard to its outcome.

Similarly, though he does not again make explicit use of the analogy with art as a point of departure in his exposition of divine providence, he does, nevertheless, make use of it a great deal in explaining divine causality, divine knowledge and will, which are, so to speak, the elements with which he has constructed his notion of divine providence. Thus, divine knowledge is the cause of all things when the divine will is joined to it, just as the knowledge of the artist is the cause of his work of art when there is added to it an inclination to that effect, which inclination is through his will. Again, God's knowledge is the cause of things, whereas things are the cause of human knowledge, just as the knowledge of the artist is a cause or principle of his work of art, whereas his work is the cause of the knowledge of those who behold it.[39] In like manner the analogy with art is used to explain the divine ideas in regard to all and every created reality, not only the things directly and concomitantly produced in the beginning, but also everything that is to be subsequently added to these.[40] Finally, in his explanation of the all-embracing, all-inclusive character of divine providence, which he proves from the all-embracing, universal causality of God, he makes the further observation that "since God's knowledge may be compared to the things themselves as the knowledge of art to the objects of art . . . all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by an art are subject to the ordering of that art."[41]

To sum up: in the *Summa Theologiae* divine providence is the eternal divine notion of the whole world of being as ordained to the ultimate end; it therefore refers to both the divine intellect and the divine will, or, to put it more exactly, to the divine understanding in

[39]See *ibid.*, I, q. 14, a. 8, et ad 3.

[40]Cf. *ibid.*, q. 15, aa. 1-3.

[41]*Ibid.*, q. 22, a. 2.

[42]By "first and second acts" are meant whatever in things is grasped by the "first and second acts" of the human understanding respectively. For an exhaustive study of this division of the acts of the human understanding as made by Aristotle and St. Thomas, see Father Lonergan's book, *Insight*, and his five *Verbum* articles in *Theological Studies*, VII (1946), 349-92; VIII (1947), 35-79, 404-44; X (1949), 3-40, 359-93. St. Thomas frequently notes that what man knows in diverse, successive acts, God knows in one, simple, "unrestricted" (Fr. Lonergan's terminology) act of understanding.

[43]Cf. *ST*, I, q. 22, a. 4, ad 2.

[44]For the certitude of divine causality and divine will, cf. *ibid.*, q. 10, aa. 6-8.

[45]*Ibid.*, q. 22, a. 4, ad 3.

relation to the divine will. The analogy with art is very useful for an analogical grasp of this divine understanding of the totality of finite being as well as of its relation to the divine will; but the analogy with prudence provides the basis for the suitableness of the name of providence given to it.

This evolution from the vague, indeterminate, abstract explanations of the earlier works (explanations which can just as well and just as easily refer to all possible worlds) to the eternal, immutable, determinate, concrete, all-embracing divine notion of the actual universe of finite being in its ordination to the ultimate end serves only to confirm and heighten the already well-defined doctrine of the *Contra Gentiles* concerning the certitude of divine providence. In other words, divine providence is no longer conceived as an essentialistic, formalistic divine concept of natures as ordered to one another and to an essentialized and formalized divine goodness as ultimate end but has become for St. Thomas the divine notion of the whole existing and changing multitude of distinct finite beings insofar as these are understood and willed in the intelligible actual unity and actual value of their total ordination to their ultimate end. Hence, the certitude of this notion is not merely in the order of first acts; that is, of forms, essences, and natures, which can hardly account for a dynamic universe shot through with contingence. Rather it is, first and foremost, a certitude in the order of second acts, grasped by the pure act of divine understanding in a single view as a completely and determinately ordered totality.[42]

The certitude of divine providence, therefore, is twofold. It is, first, the certitude of divine knowledge, inasmuch as whatever God understands to occur cannot not occur exactly as it has been understood to occur.[43] Second, it is the certitude of divine causality and divine will,[44] inasmuch as divine providence implies not simply any knowledge but that knowledge to which the will is joined and which therefore causes what is known to occur or to be. Thus, divine providence is certain insofar as it "does not fail to produce its effect and that in the way foreseen,"[45] imposing on each occurrence, existence, and activity the kind of necessity which it ordains each to have, either the necessity compatible with freedom and contingency, or the necessity

not compatible with these.[46] Consequently, in the *Summa Theologiae*, St. Thomas no longer mentions the differences he used to bring up in the *Commentary on the Sentences* and in the *De Veritate* concerning the certitude of predestination as compared with that of providence. For providence, as well as predestination, looks to the actual outcome of the ordering; and just as providence is the eternal, infallible, and determinate divine notion of the total order of all things to their end, so predestination is the eternal, infallible, and determinate divine notion of the direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal. Predestination, then, is simply a part of providence.[47] Its certitude does not differ from that of divine providence; namely, a certitude that involves the control of not only the occurrence of what is ordained and intended (*provisum*) by providence but also its manner of occurrence, since God produces and controls all being insofar as being.[48]

Similarly, in his explanation of fate (in the Christian and not the pagan sense), St. Thomas does not place the immutability of the disposition, the seriation or order of secondary causes in the universe to their effects, in the immutability of the secondary causes themselves but in the immutability and certainty of divine providence.[49] Nor does he make all things depend on fate, for the simple reason that not all things are caused by secondary causes.[50] Consequently, since divine providence, for St. Thomas, extends to all things, not only to the ordering of the secondary causes and of their own effects but to the ordering of simply all created being and activity,[51] the immutability of divine providence is not compromised by the occurrence in the universe of effects immediately caused by God.

The *De Malo* does not say much about divine providence except to confirm the doctrine in the *Summa Theologiae*. Thus it reiterates the immutability of divine providence and explains the perfect compatibility of such immutability with free will in creatures.[52] It reaffirms the all-inclusive character of divine providence, explains the certitude of providence in terms of the certitude of divine knowledge and the efficacy of the divine will, and shows how this certitude of divine

[46]Cf. *ibid.*, q. 19, a. 8, ad 3.
[47]See *ibid.*, q. 23, a. 1.
[48]Cf. *ibid.*, a. 6.
[49]Cf. *ibid.*, q. 116, a. 3.
[50]Cf. *ibid.*, a. 4.
[51]See *ibid.*, q. 22, a. 2.
[52]See *De Malo*, q. 6, a. un., ad 3.
[53]See *ibid.*, q. 16, a. 7, ad 15.
[54]Cf. *In I Periherm.*, lect. 14; *In VI Metaphys.*, lect. 3.

knowledge and this efficacy of divine will and causality, far from doing away with contingency in things, insure this very contingency.[53]

In his commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *Peri Hermeneias*, St. Thomas, trying to reconcile Aristotle's doctrine of contingency with the fact of providence, further confirms, in no uncertain terms, his notion of providence as found in the *Summa Theologiae*. In the first place, he again explains the infallible efficacy and immutability of divine providence in terms of the certainty of divine knowledge and the efficacy of divine will and causality with regard to the totality of finite being. In the second place, he reaffirms that the certitude and immutability of divine providence are in no way incompatible with chance, contingency, and free will in creatures by pointing out the uniqueness of the causality of providence, in that it causes not only the coming into being of things but also their nature, necessity, contingency; in short, everything that pertains to their being and everything on which they somehow or other depend.[54]

If the above interpretations are correct, the following general conclusion may be proposed. The variations and differences noted by some of Aquinas's commentators in his writings regarding the causal certitude of providence are really nothing but the corollaries of a concomitant and parallel series of variations and developments involving the notion of providence itself. For as soon as St. Thomas has expressed his understanding of providence in terms of his understanding of divine knowledge, will, and causality and has given merely subordinate roles to its analogy with art and prudence, it becomes clear why the limited certitude he attributed at first to the causality of providence had to be expanded into the certitude proper to the absolute efficacy of divine knowledge and will as the universal and transcendent cause of things. Because God is universal cause, His providence must be certain with respect to all events and occurrences in the universe; because He is a transcendent cause, His causally certain providence not only does not impede but even insures the very contingency and freedom of created causes.

Freedom of Discussion." The next *Conversaciones Pensamiento* will be held at Loyola in 1962.

S. Y. Watson, s.j.

The Missouri State Philosophical Association held its thirteenth annual meeting on October 14 and 15, at the University of Missouri, Columbia. Professor Elizabeth Eames, of Washington University, discussed the topic, "Contemporary Analysis of Causality." While admitting that the empiricists' description of causality as temporal sequence was unsatisfactory, the speaker did not see how the other solutions were conclusive or passed the test of analysis. Mr. L. H. Hackstaff, of the University of Missouri, showed in his paper, "Logic, Old and New," that symbolic logic is more in continuity with, and a development of, Aristotelian Logic than is generally admitted. In the final paper of the afternoon, Professor John J. Kessler, of Saint Louis, made some observations on the functions of words. His paper bore the title "A Metaphysics for Semanticists." The outgoing president, Dr. C. Eugene Canover, of Lindenwood College, gave a competent and penetrating paper, "The Role of Philosophers concerning Convictions." Dr. Canover stressed the need for attention to context, philosophical, theological, religious, scientific, and so on, in any effort of language analysis, and discussed what presuppositions are at work or need to be established in any depth analysis of language. The discussion afterward was lively and enlightening. Saturday morning, from 9:30 to 12:00, a symposium was held on the "Philosophy of Religion and the Existence of God." The first speaker, Dr. T. William Bell, of Stephens College, discussed what religious knowledge means to the existentialists; Reverend Maurice Holloway, s.j., of St. Louis University, followed with a paper on the possibility of proving the existence of God through an analysis of the moral commitment of the adult to the moral good. In the final paper, Professor Arthur Berndtson, of the University of Missouri, revisited the ontological argument for the existence of God. The final upshot of any such argument, he showed, is to recognize pure possibility as the ultimate source of all finite actuality. Questions from the floor helped to clarify the different points made in the papers. The new president for the coming year is Professor Maurice Eames, of Washington University, with Professor James T. Reagan, of St. Louis University, remaining as secretary. The next meeting of the association will be held at Lindenwood College, St. Charles, Missouri.

"Philosophy and the Integration of Contemporary Catholic Education" is the title of a workshop to be held at Catholic University from June 16 to 27. The purpose of the workshop will be to study the contributions of philosophy to that data which is distinctive of contemporary Catholic higher education. Beginning with a study of the dimensions of reality and knowledge, the workshop will discuss, in its conferences and seminars, such topics as the relationship between science and philosophy, between moral philosophy and moral life, between philosophy and education, and so on. The director will be Reverend George F. McLean, O.M.I.; the lecturers will include, among others, Rt. Reverend John K. Ryan; Allan Wolter, O.F.M.; Benedict Ashley, O.P.; Robert Henle, S.J.; William Wallace, O.P.; Leo Foley, S.M.; and Dr. Donald Gallagher. For information, write to the Director of Workshops, Catholic University of America, Washington 17, D.C.

The Institute for Philosophical Research has announced the completion of Volume II of *The Idea of Freedom*. It will be as large as Volume I and will deal with all the controversies about the subject of freedom. The Institute is also planning to publish a shortened and popularly written version of these two volumes. Mr. Adler, founder of the Institute in 1952, had also announced that his staff has begun a new project: an analysis of the idea of love. Other ideas being considered for subsequent treatment are progress, justice, law, democracy, and education. Mr. Robert G. Hazo has been appointed Associate Director of the Institute.

Körner on the Logic of Thinking: Some Queries and Objections

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When it was first published, Stephan Körner's volume on the logic of thinking[1] had a mixed reception, some of the reviewers thinking that it was, despite its importance, not easily intelligible.[2] Instead of adding another review of the whole book to those already printed, I shall discuss a number of separate positions which Körner has sought to establish. The book *is* difficult, partly because many of its words bear unfamiliar meanings but much more so because its author often changes the tactics of his exposition, so that a reader seizing the neatly branched terms in one chapter finds himself confronted by a quite new principle of division in another. This would be acceptable enough, indeed it would be a challenge, were we also told that the terms must alter their meanings as new levels

[1]*Conceptual Thinking: A Logical Inquiry*. Published for the University of Bristol (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1955). All page references, unless otherwise specified, are to this book.

[2]I shall excerpt passages from typical views. ". . . one of the most striking and original pieces . . . in English since the end of the war. . . . There is some danger that its importance may go unrecognized" (D. J. O'Connor, *Philosophical Quarterly*, VII [April, 1957], 183). "One or two of the basic notions . . . are explained rather too sketchily" (*ibid.*, 184). ". . . difficult and demanding . . . ambitious in that the philosophical territory that it covers is very wide . . ." (J. O. Urmson, *Philosophy*, XXXII [July, 1957], 267). ". . . I suspect that Körner's use of some of the apparently precise terms . . . involves the suppression rather than the elimination of some of the thorny difficulties in the notion of linguistic rules . . ." (*ibid.*, 268). ". . . ambiguities and obscurities . . . difficult to read. . . . Its ultimate perplexities, however, are the philosophical problems surrounding conceptual thinking" (H. A. Bedau, *Philosophy of Science*, XXIV [January, 1957], p. 89). ". . . ambitious and interesting . . . merits not only commendation but careful study . . . [attempts] to construct an original and all-encompassing system for solving the traditional problems of philosophy, along with providing a good many of the solutions themselves . . . prodigious undertaking" (John O. Nelson, *Philosophical Review*, LXVI [July, 1957], p. 402).

[3]P. 10.

[4]Pp. 14, 13.

[5]P. 222.

[6]Professor Stuart MacClintock, in a paper on the question of the ontological neutrality of speculative medieval grammars (delivered at the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Western Division, Spring, 1959), pointed out that it is very likely that there are modes of signifying in some languages radically unassimilable to others. In such cases, he added, translation would not be a clearcut matter of reduplication, but only "an approximation, or condition of proportionality."

in the inquiry are reached; but we are not so told. Indeed the whole effort of Körner appears to waver between a theory of explicit, fixed rules of usage of terms and a practice of shifting their meanings.

But Körner's book is refreshing. In spite of its being a work mainly about language-structure, it avoids both the tired dogmas of many Positivists and also the tortured grammatical misgivings of the newer analysts. Körner produces a constructive theory, with some room in it for metaphysics, aesthetics, and morals; yet he does without the artificial schemata of Positivists who draw up arrays of symbols and languages. In like manner, he is impressed very little by the doctrine which gives the man in the street the right to legislate, albeit unwittingly, concerning the subtleties of ontology and the axioms of the good life.[3]

1. Nature of Concepts

To judge from the title of his treatise, the center of attention for Körner is the concept, which for him is a sign whose governing rules include a synonymity rule; that is, a rule which permits arbitrary replacement of that sign by any of its synonyms.[4] "Signs" is an undefined term in his theory, and about all that he tells us is that discursive signs—which can be used as predicates, concepts, statements, and propositions—should include signs neither visual nor auditory.[5] The discursive signs, which are chiefly those governed by ostensive rules, all have the property of interchangeability—not indefinitely, though it would be fruitless to try to specify just where the interchangeability must end. (Körner seems to have made a slip here, because predicates, one of the four types of signs, are differentiated from concepts by *not* being governed by synonymity rules. But perhaps he could explain this with little trouble.) It should be emphasized that rules determine not the fact that a proposition will be used but that it is used in a certain way. The addition of rules of synonymity is what makes the concept a concept, the proposition (which contains concepts) a proposition.

This raises a question about the replaceability of terms, either in everyday language or in philosophical. It seems to me that what distinguishes concepts is rather the uniqueness of each; and this is even shown by the fact that, contrary to what many Positivists say, the languages of the world seldom contain exact substitutes for each other. Prefaces to translations of the classics are strewn with disclaimers to the pretention that pivotal terms are rendered by anything like their proper counterparts. The translation of *Vorstellung* by "idea," "presentation," "representation," "mental image," is no better than the translation of *ousia* by "substance," "being," "entity," or whatnot.[6] One can, it is true, think of certain concepts

which are from time to time replaceable by others. Thus Locke's "simple idea" is in some respects equivalent to Hume's "impression," but by no means in all; and it would be highly coincidental were these two concepts, which are the starting-points of theories traced out by totally different methods, to mean the same throughout all contexts.

2. Acceptance of Concepts

Körner has promised us the logic of thinking, insofar as thought deals with concepts. Now a well-known definition of thinking makes it the operation with signs,[7] and Körner seems to take this for granted. But I feel that something more should be said by him concerning the relation of his "accepter of ostensive rules," which is in essence what he means by the conceptual thinker;[8] and precisely what is it that the "accepter" accepts? Acceptance is belief,[9] but what do we believe in when we believe in a concept? Do we believe that the concept is true? If so, the concept has sense; it is a proposition. Do we believe that the concept has meaning? If so, we are merely holding a tautology; we are merely holding that the concept, which must have meaning to be a concept, does in fact have meaning. Do we believe that the concept follows rules; that is, that its use in this case is following a rule? Or, to put it another way, do we believe a series of discursively arrayed rules to the effect that we, and other persons to boot, will be constrained to use a sign in such and such ways? Do we not rather immediately grasp the concept as having a meaning which derives from what is signified and then, later on, set about to formulate a few very simple descriptions of, and prescriptions for, the uses of the concepts? I am simply trying to make the most of an empirical fact that many persons are able to speak clearly and truly even if they remain quite

[7]Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1958), p. 6.

[8]See pp. 7, 31, 32 in *Conceptual Thinking.*

[9]Or better, "intention to apply." See pp. 5, 218.

[10]P. 7.

[11]P. 3.

[12]Charles A. Baylis, in his review of Körner's books, has this to say: "His attempt to give an account of ostensive rules raises more questions than it answers. He notes that such rules are usually formulated by pointing to the particular things and saying that these and all things like them are to be called instances of some concept, say, 'red.' But everything is like a red thing in some respect. Is it not necessary somehow to indicate the respect in which similarity is required, in this case likeness of color? But then, how are the ostensive rules for 'colored' to be set up? Presumably by pointing to some examples of colored things and generalizing to all things like them in some respect. But what respect? Basic difficulties such as these are not touched upon by Körner" (*Journal of Philosophy*, LIV [January, 1957], 53).

[13]*Concerning the Teacher*, chaps. 2-10.

unaware that rules of grammar can be formulated at all and that, in addition, philosophers in many instances almost completely neglect the forming of rules.

3. The Question of Likeness

Let us return to Körner's grammar of naming. It boils down to the fact that for one great class of concepts, ostensive ones, we can say, "This and this (and here we make suitable gestures) and everything like it is to be called 'green.' "[10] Now this sort of interpretation is dangerous when what we seek is precise terms, for it implies that "like" is also a concept whose meaning can be pointed to, and that, even more remotely, "everything" is too. Or, if the concepts are not ostensive, they are still definable so as to be clearer to the accepter of ostensive rules (and this includes children who call green things "green," says Körner).[11] And there ensues thus the classic difficulty, noted also by Baylis,[12] about the respect in which the likeness is to be sought, and, I should add, about the degree of likeness, even when the respect is known. St. Augustine[13] had much to say about the inadequacy of ostensive definitions when these are isolated and made to apply to individual things or acts; and Wittgenstein, who in several respects uses a method like St. Augustine's, himself shows that one of the chief difficulties with these definitions is precisely on the point of what constitutes likeness. But even if we could say, "This, this, and this, and everything else which has a color like these in respect of hue, not chroma or value, is to be called 'green' "—even then the matter would not be settled, for clearly blue is still like green in a fashion in which red is not. Without these restrictions, it is still worse; for when I point to "this" and say it is green, my hearer may easily think that to be green means to be the particular size of this green thing or to have some other characteristic. Even more, Körner fails to distinguish generic kinds of likeness. One shade of green is certainly like another shade of green in a way far different from that in which two large things are like each other or two events happening at the same time are like each other. Yet I find nothing in *Conceptual Thinking* to indicate that "large" and "simultaneous" differ radically as predicates.

I should also like to raise an issue about the meaning of "everything" in the phrase "and everything like it." If Körner wishes to say "and everything that you will encounter," then he is speaking so informally and so much *ad hominem* that his theory loses the precision I believe he wishes to impart to it. If, on the other hand, he means "and everything of the same sort, whether or not it becomes a part of your experience," then I beg to take issue. It is a statement which makes many assumptions about a

totality of things in the world—things, it happens, that are required to be all alike—and at the same time renders it impossible to name single things. The Colossus of Rhodes, lacking a duplicate or class of duplicates, could not be referred to in conceptual thought.

4. What is Ostensive?

One of Körner's contentions is to the effect that a concept, in order to have an ostensive basis, must be free not only from internal contradiction but also from compounding. Although, he says, "'green' and 'shrill-sounding' are clearly ostensive concepts, the necessary exemplifying set (of green things pointed to) and 'like-it' clause are not available for either 'green and shrill-sounding' or 'green or shrill-sounding.'"[14] One may argue with this on two different grounds. If, to begin with, we deny that ostension in Körner's sense really fixes the meanings of terms (as I do deny), then we should add that the concern about the expressions of the so-called logical connectives is beside the point. In other words, though it is quite true that there is a distinction between "green" and "or," it is not to be expressed in terms of ostension and its absence. On the other hand, if we were to allow (as I prefer not to) that the simple concepts are ostensively fixed, then we may as well allow that their compounds are likewise, for the following reason, which I think is consistent with Körner's own principles. I point to a katydid, and I can well say that this is both green and shrill, and the same for everything just like it. Indeed, it is perhaps easier to communicate what I mean by these conjoined adjectives because the denotation is ever so much narrower than for "green" or "shrill" taken alone. About "green *or* shrill" I do have doubts. It would be far-fetched to look for cute instances that might suit this

[14]P. 38.

[15]I confess that I had hoped to find some confirmation for this in Jean Piaget's *Judgment and Reasoning in the Child* (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1952). But in spite of his dealing with a number of other words, chiefly the word "because," he does not take up the word "or." I therefore will stand for the time being on personal observation of a very young conceptual thinker (in *my* sense) in my own family.

[16]Pp. 17-18.

[17]See, for example, pp. 34-35.

[18]I know that some readers will have become increasingly annoyed by my references to interior properties of concepts—concepts which are, after all, fabrications, with no natures of their own. But other artifacts—cars, poems, phonograph records of Alvin the Chipmunk—have many properties by which they are distinguishable, some of these being more essential than others.

[19]On p. 32, footnote, Körner promises a new book, on which he has collaborated with A. Fröhlich, dealing with his reconstruction of the mathematical treatment required for predicates, on the principles stated in *Conceptual Thinking*. Although I have tried to find references to this book in journals and catalogues I have evidently missed them and must accordingly apologize for dealing with no more than Körner's bare outline of his replacement for Boolean algebra.

expression; but it is not far-fetched to find one to fit "road to the right or to the left," where the two roads are integral in the total situation or where the "or" can be shown to be implicit in the fact that one can take but a single road at a time. Clearly a child can learn this sense of "or," if shown enough *unlike* choices, such as "strawberry or vanilla," "the dog book or the train book," and so forth.[15] At any rate, it is clear that a child comes to know "or" through experience long before he can gather any abstract account, such as FTTF, of this connective.

5. Concepts and Entailments

Körner offers three marks of proposition,[16] the first of which is that only a proposition entails or is entailed. When we say, on the other hand, that P is contained by Q (both of them being concepts), we mean in addition that Q is implied by P.[17] Concepts entail concepts, and by this Körner seems to mean not just any concepts but those which are often called subjects or predicates (in two propositions) or are called relata (in a single "relational proposition"). Entailment for him is thus not a process or form of reasoning, or a progress from one proposition to another, but is rather a matter of the assigned meanings of concepts.[18] We pass from "cat" to "mammal" by an entailment, or from "green" to "colored," and we do this not by means of a middle term or a rule of *modus ponens* (both of which guarantee not only the correctness but also the newness of our result). I have no special quarrel with this theory. But it apparently leads to a great deal of philosophizing by tacit agreement, as it were. Many writers take for granted nowadays that a generic entailment or predication ("green as a color") is self-evident, that to be green is necessarily an instance of being a color, if for no other reason than that it has been used so often in essays of just this sort. But if green *is* in fact a color necessarily, then this necessity is the thing to be shown by some proof. The proof would not destroy the necessity, would not render the original statement an a-posteriori proposition. What I fear is that Körner has not left room for devices of proof by which to do this. If what we are interested in is relations between terms (concepts), all we can do with them, on his showing, is to describe how they are to be used, give their attendant rules, and let the necessary relations henceforward take care of themselves.

6. Primitive Relations between Concepts

Körner, like many others, offers criticisms of Boolean algebras, and he lays special stress upon his new approach.[19] (In what follows, I shall

mean by "Boolean," the text of George Boole himsef, though no doubt Körner would be willing to add the work of Peirce and Schröder and, indeed, that of anyone seeking to calculate with fixed classes.)

Körner distinguishes between what he calls the three *exact* primitive logical relations (inclusion, as when "green" implies "colored"; exclusion, as when "square" implies "not round"; and overlap, as when "green" and "square" partially include each other, and partially exclude) and the two *inexact* primitive relations (one, that of inclusion-or-overlap, as when "black" sometimes includes "raven" and sometimes overlaps with "raven"; and the other, that of exclusion-or-overlap, as when "black" now excludes "sheep" and now overlaps with "sheep").[20] Notice that Körner has concepts whose meanings are made rigid in all contexts by rules and that he now finds it necessary to set up imprecise relations between them. Boole, on the other hand, invented an algebra of a very simple sort, asking only that concepts be held constant in their meaning while any given calculation was being conducted. It is quite true that he divided the universe exhaustively into x and 1-x,—that is, x and everything not x—and likewise that he treated x and its simple negative, -x, as being exclusive of each other; but it is also true that these two pairs of terms could be made to symbolize indefinite negations if so desired. When Boole came to two diverse properties, such as green and red, or green and hard, then all he required was that each member of the pair be symbolized by a different letter, say, x and y. This gave him the well-known tetrad of things both x and y, things x but not y, things y but not x, and lastly things neither x nor y. It may be that we do not have Körner's inexact primitive relations here, in any one of the four sets of the tetrad. To this there are two answers: Nobody has said we could apply no more than one of the sets to a given situation, say a sheepfold; and furthermore, "classes" so vaguely related as Körner permits not only are hard to deal with but also betray a kind of accidentality of relation which forms but a feeble basis for scientific discourse.[21] Thus the fact that ravens are black is true enough, I suppose (unless the ornithologists discover some white ones to keep company with the black swans that have confounded the logicians!), but here all the interesting possibilities for discussion end. It is simply false that "black" and "raven" are two terms (subjects, predicates, or

[20]Pp. 34-37.

[21]Körner comes close to admitting this, I think, when he says: "In stating that the logical relation of inclusion-or-overlap holds between two ostensive concepts we do not imply either that, in the universe, every instance of the first concept is in fact also an instance of the second, or that this is not so. We do not even imply that every instance of the first concept which is, ever has been, or ever will be observed, is also an instance of the second concept, nor do we imply that this is not so" (p. 95).

relata) which can have essential connection, even though we can convert "All ravens are black" to "Some black things are ravens." But in doing this we are no longer talking about "black" as a concept in the same sense as before. Our new, converse proposition is a weak accidental truth about kinds of things, without any of the epistemic force of the convertend, which after all does tell us something that may be strictly true about ravens.

7. Which Words Represent Concepts?

Our author says:

> A Boolean class-inclusion . . . can be represented on the one hand by the houses in a town whose perimeter is fixed and does not touch any house and, on the other hand, by the houses in a county whose order is similarly fixed, provided that the county surrounds the town. It is then, of course, always possible to indicate the houses which lie in the county but not in the town. We might, however, assume that the town lies within the county, that about some houses we know that they lie in the town and therefore in the county, that we also know how to give further examples of such; but, while assuming all this, assume also that nevertheless we do not know any of the borders. We then cannot give any example of a house which lies in the county but not in the town. In making these assumptions we should not be guilty of ostensive rules which makes it self-contradictory to say that *some* inclusions between ostensive classes (and therefore between ostensive concepts) have no exemplifiable and thus no ostensive complements.[22]

But to this we say that it is not a question of manipulating a pair of concepts ("houses-in-county," "houses-in-town") but rather one of finding the proper meanings for certain other expressions as well, some of them being words not ordinarily considered to be concepts at all. This, of course, is not Boole's answer; and he would instead have reinterpreted his algebra to represent, not classes or even propositions, but probabilities that certain houses lie in the town as well as in the county, the total numbers being specified. Nor is the answer one that would be given by those making a sharp distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic words, or between variables and constants. I should complain to Körner that the little words cannot be taken for granted. What do we mean by saying that a house is *in* a town, or *in* a county, assuming that the latter has boundaries but that the former, the town, has none? This could be a fruitful approach—to open up all parts of the proposition to semantic scrutiny, to suppose that two propositions containing the same subject

concepts and the same predicate concepts can still signify quite differently as long as we take seriously the variations in meaning of the connectives and particles. Surely the effort to assimilate the range of expressions to relations between substantive or adjective concepts—five relations, two of which are admittedly imprecise—would seem fruitless from the start.

I suspect that Körner has ignored the excellent suggestion from W. E. Johnson, that of separating of the elements of logic taken constitutively from these same elements taken epistemically. This suggestion implies that a proposition can be considered in its formal relationships to its negation or to a totally different proposition, irrespective of whether and how we know the original proposition to be true—or false. But the entertaining of the proposition with any but a wholly arbitrary assignment of truth-values involves knowing it, and this in turn requires that it be fitted into a system of ideas and sensations. Now, Körner starts with concepts, and he certainly intends these to be taken epistemically, though his view of them is open to some of the questions broached in this essay. But when he comes to treat concepts at length he handles them as if they enjoyed no more than constitutive relationships with their fellow-concepts. They are ranged into orders and types by him (I regret that space considerations outweigh the desirability of expounding his theory here and now[23]) in such a way that they can function significantly only if their original meaning, their autonomy as concepts, so to speak, had been withdrawn from them and reapplied by systems of rules of use in hierarchies. I suppose this could be done well enough; but it seems to be an inversion of better philosophic insights to treat concepts as if they were like formal inferences and at the same time assert, without much proof, that they apply to things. Would we not be playing with counters rather than with coin?

As I look over these seven little sections, I begin to be remorseful that they are so much given over to demurrers, even cavils. More should be said in behalf of the book. My essay speaks not at all, for instance, about an interesting reinterpretation of the laws of thought (*Conceptual Thinking*, chap. 9), about an account of empirical laws of nature that deserves close attention (chap. 11), an inquiry into immediate experience (chap. 20), or

[22]p. 40.

[23]This is the chief topic of the second part of his book. Propositions have directly or indirectly given bases; they are descriptive or interpretive; and concepts are somewhat similarly stratified. There are, for instance (p. 149), horizontal and vertical entailments. The reason these topics are not being discussed here is that the other part, the concept considered as such, is stressed by Körner and receives somewhat more original treatment.

[24]What is really needed is a much more searching examination, written by someone with an orientation closer to Professor Körner's than is my own. My chief hope is that the questions I have raised will be of service to such a future commentator, who, after all, will be bound to lay bare the pros and cons of his judgment.

a chapter on the instrumental and contemplative applications of concepts. However often one might dredge up objections, these are still more than merely worthwhile contributions.[24] Almost none of my quarrels with the book derives from the opinion that it is slipshod (I hold no such opinion) but rather from my failure to see how a book on this subject can afford deliberately to omit or deny so much. Let us say it is needful to know about things and minds in order to illuminate the subject of words. Körner attempts to give a discussion of concepts *überhaupt*, but I think its very completeness of detail may have misled the author into believing he had achieved completeness of scope. This raises the interesting question whether the present survey of his book should have brought up a number of the issues it discusses at all. The only reply is to say that I was led to look for that second kind of completeness, a philosophical rather than a classificatory completeness, because I took seriously one word in the title. Had this book been headed *Concepts: A Logical Inquiry*, it may be supposed that I would have been ungrudging, though a little restrained, in praise of its tactics. But when a book is said to be about thinking, which is so much more complex and exciting, I begin to wonder whether it is using the right strategies.

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Le Philosophe et la théologie. **By Etienne Gilson. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1960. Pp. 259. NF 10.**

Elements of Christian Philosophy. **By Etienne Gilson. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1960. Pp. 358. $6.95.**

The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine. **By Etienne Gilson. New York: Random House, 1960. Pp. 398. $7.50.**

Le Philosophe et la théologie is a witty, clear, and interesting account of the intellectual journey of its author from complete ignorance of the notion of Christian philosophy to the profound knowledge of this *philosophandi genus* drawn from a lifelong acquaintance with medieval philosophy. Neither his professors at the Sorbonne nor their contemporaries on the Catholic faculties of the day were of much help to him. The former simply assumed, with Victor Cousin, that, after a medieval hiatus in which "there was nothing but theology," philosophy resumed its progress with Descartes at the point where the demise of Greek philosophy had left it. The latter, whether friendly or hostile to St. Thomas, simply took it for granted that the Angelic Doctor, in common with the other medieval Scholastics, taught a philosophy indistinguishable in its main lines from that of Aristotle.

In 1905, however, Gilson's mentor, Lucien Levy-Bruhl, suggested as a thesis topic *Descartes et la scolastique*. The result was Gilson's major work, *La Liberté chez Descartes et la théologie* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1913). After its publication the thesis that Descartes had picked up philosophy where the Greeks had left it could no longer be maintained. Remove from the philosophy of Descartes the idea of God as the unique, simple, sovereignly free, creative efficient cause of the universe, or that of man as a creature, made in the image of God, and possessed of a spiritual and immortal soul, and you no longer have Cartesianism. Yet none of these ideas can be found in Aristotle. Their source, Gilson discovered, was not the philosophical treatises of the Greeks but specifically theological works of the medieval Scholastics. The theology of the medievals thus revealed itself as the seedbed of authentically philosophical notions which have subsequently been incorporated into the religiously neutral systems of modern Western philosophers. It was important therefore to examine more closely the

relation of philosophy to theology in the works of the Scholastic doctors, to whose creative thought so many of our modern philosophical ideas owe their origin.

The research required for the preparation of the early editions of *Le Thomisme* and *La Philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, and the fresh light thrown on the theologies of these two doctors by the controversies subsequent to the publication of these works, brought their author to two important conclusions. There had never existed in the Middle Ages a single philosophy common to all the Scholastics. Despite the similarity of their common Aristotelian technique, the philosophies of St. Bonaventure and of St. Thomas are radically different; and the same could be said of the philosophies of Duns Scotus and of William Ockham. Neither could there be found in the Middle Ages any autonomous system of philosophy proceeding from creatures to God according to the philosophical order and clearly distinguished from theology as a separate and independent discipline. All the medieval systems, including that of St. Thomas, were theologies; and what passes today for the philosophy of St. Thomas is, in most cases, nothing more than a series of theses extracted from their theological context in his works and rearranged according to the philosophical order by his modern intepreters.

Since the diversity of the various medieval theologies was due to the different philosophies employed by the Scholastic doctors as an instrument in their theological speculation, the genuine unity of their thought could scarcely be attributed to their common Aristotelianism. It is due rather to the common faith which animated these authors and to their unfailing practice of carrying out all their speculation, including philosophical speculation, within the framework of truth communicated to the Christian by divine revelation and accepted by him through the gift of faith. This was the principal theme of Gilson's *Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*. The spirit of medieval philosophy, Gilson concluded in that work, was the spirit of "Christian philosophy."

Christian philosophy, as it was found in the works of the Scholastic doctors, consisted of a series of genuinely philosophical propositions about God, the world, and man, which, since their evidence is purely rational, could be proposed by a modern philosopher as well as a medieval theologian. This philosophy, however, differs from the autonomous rationalistic systems of the modern philosophers in that it is an integral part of the science which St. Thomas calls *sacra doctrina*, the theological investigation of God and the world in its relation to God, which has its origin in the Christian's participation of God's knowledge through the virtue of faith. Revelation thus sets the problems for the philosophical speculation found in *sacra doctrina*; and revelation gives the philosopher

the light he needs to assimilate and transform the teachings of the pagan philosophers so that they may more accurately express the true nature of reality. What is proposed in the philosophical speculations of the Scholastic theologian rests always on genuinely philosophical evidence; but the Christian philosophy of the medieval theologians would lose its genuine character if it were taken out of its context in a *sacra doctrina* whose starting point is faith and whose order of development must be the theological order which descends from God to creatures.

Three decades of controversy have failed to shake Gilson's conviction that the philosophy of St. Thomas is a Christian philosophy in the sense that he has given to that term since the composition of *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*. Subsequently to its publication, he tells us in *Le Philosophe et la théologie*, he found confirmation for his position in his reading of *Aeterni Patris*. In that encyclical, Leo XIII recommends St. Thomas's *genus philosophandi*, philosophical speculation carried out under the direction of the truth of revelation; and this *genus philosophandi*, surely part of *sacra doctrina*, is called in the title of that *magna charta* of modern Thomism "Christian philosophy."

In *Elements of Christian Philosophy* Gilson explains in more detail how the philosophy of the Angelic Doctor, incorporated into his *sacra doctrina*, fulfills the requirements of Christian philosophy. It consists of a series of theses about God and the world in its relation to God; and its order of exposition is the required theological one. The notion of God, proposed by faith to St. Thomas the theologian, provokes a series of philosophical reflections concerning the demonstration of God's existence and the knowledge accessible to human reason of the divine essence and the divine names. It is in the light of our knowledge of God's pure creative *esse* that St. Thomas can explain philosophically what it means for a creature to be and to be a cause, and how it is possible for man to be a complete substance informed by an immortal soul whose intellect must find its perfection in the release of the intelligibility of material beings grasped in sense experience.

Faith proposed to the Angelic Doctor a notion of God richer and deeper than that of the Prime Mover of Aristotle and the First Cause and Supremely Necessary Being of Avicenna. It was revelation therefore which enabled St. Thomas in his philosophical reflection to absorb and transform their proofs of God's existence, mutually exclusive in their own systems, in the constitution of his own *quinque viae*. From the scriptural name of God, *I am*, St. Thomas drew his master thesis that *esse* is the act of being; and his theological consideration of God's dynamic *esse*, proceeding within the Godhead in the processions of the Trinity and proceeding out of the Godhead in the creation of the being of creatures, enabled him to

transform Aristotle's moving cause into the efficient cause *quae influit esse in aliud*; even more, that same consideration of participation in the divine dynamic *esse* enabled St. Thomas to ground the substantial reality and proper causality of creatures more firmly than it had been ever grounded before. The same act of *esse*, received in the simple human soul which then associates the body with its substantial reality, enabled him also to establish philosophically a point which on purely Aristotelian principles is undemonstrable, that the form of a body can be an immortal, spiritual substance. Released thereby from the necessity of preserving the soul's immortality by dissociating it from the body in the Platonic manner, St. Thomas can give the body its proper share in man's substantial being and activity. Man is not a soul using a body; man is the union of soul and matter without which the soul could not begin to be, and without which the sense knowledge on which its intellectual operations are dependent could not be obtained.

St. Thomas clearly is not simply another Aristotelian philosopher. He is a Christian theologian who, reflecting philosophically on God and the world under the inspiration of revelation, has absorbed and transformed the doctrine of the Philosopher. The Angelic Doctor, in other words, is a Christian philosopher.

A masterly exposition of a very different Christian philosophy is found in *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*. This book is a translation of the second edition of *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*. Dr. L. E. M. Lynch is to be commended for his excellent and eminently readable translation of a text which remains, in the opinion of the reviewer, the finest modern introduction to St. Augustine in any language. In its three main sections—devoted to knowledge, moral life, and the works of God—all the major Augustinian themes of sense knowledge, divine illumination, grace, freedom, creation, time, the image of God in man, and so on, are discussed with the clarity, conciseness, and synthetic power which are the marks of M. Gilson's work as a historian.

For Gilson the distinguishing note of a Christian philosophy is its notion of being, found in its highest perfection in the notion of God, from whom it radiates its light on creatures. For St. Thomas, the notion of being was *id quod habet esse*; and God was supremely being because He was supremely *esse*. For St. Augustine, He is supremely being who is supremely true in immutable and eternal necessity. It is interesting to observe therefore how in his Christian philosophy the notion of creation, the proof of the immortality of the soul, and the conception of human knowledge differ from these elements of the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas described by Gilson in his *Elements of Christian Philosophy*. According to St. Augustine the matter created by God must be formed by

the divine illumination in order to receive a share in the divine stability; and with changeless stability rather than *esse* as the ultimate reality, St. Augustine is never willing to concede to mutable creatures the same autonomy in being and activity which St. Thomas assures to them through participation in the divine *esse*. Nor will St. Augustine be able to make use of *esse* to show how an immortal, spiritual substance can still be truly the form of a body. For him, the soul is immortal precisely because it is not an Aristotelian form but a spiritual substance, ruling a body on which it can act as its superior while remaining immune from its counter-action. Sensation therefore must be an action of the soul alone; and the necessity of our true judgments, possessed of a stability which fluctuating creatures cannot ground, must come through the divine illumination from the Truth which rules its inferior, the mind, as the mind in turn rules its inferior, the body.

St. Thomas's metaphysics of *esse* leads to a theory of knowledge in which being, causality, contingence—in short, the data that lead the mind to a philosophical proof of God's existence—are given to us in our sense experience of physical reality. St. Augustine's metaphysics of necessary truth, on the other hand, leads to a theory of knowledge according to which the evidence for God is found within the mind as the necessary truth which is the object of its dynamism. St. Augustine and St. Thomas are both Christian philosophers; both transformed a pagan philosophy under the influence of revelation; but while St. Thomas transformed the philosophy of Aristotle, St. Augustine transformed the wisdom of Plotinus; and of the two, Gilson is convinced, St. Thomas was the more successful.

In the three books discussed in this review it is not hard to discern M. Gilson's conception of the philosophy of St. Thomas, the philosophy to which he gives his personal adherence. It is a Christian philosophy, carried on within the sacred doctrine accepted by the grace of faith and necessarily following the theological order of development. It is an Aristotelianism, radically transformed by the repercussions in the whole system of the authentically Thomistic notion of being as *id quod est*, yet remaining Aristotelian enough to find its proofs for God's existence and its introduction to metaphysics in the physical world presented in sense experience. Faithful to that basic orientation, its theory of knowledge is a frank and downright realism that rejects any approach to epistemology which would ground the necessity of our judgments on any sort of contribution to their immutable necessity by the human mind. We are already in the realm of the being of metaphysics in the material objects presented to our intellect in sense experience, or we will never reach it. The man who begins his quest for being within his mind will never find his way out into the world of reality.

It is not surprising therefore that the interpretation of the philosophy of St. Thomas presented in *Le Philosophe et la théologie* and in *Elements of Christian Philosophy* has not won universal approval among contemporary Thomists. Gilson's conception of Thomism as a Christian philosophy may have won the approval of Thomists as eminent as Jacques Maritain; but it has also been attacked vigorously on historical grounds by scholars of international reputation, such as Van Steenberghen and Vignaux. And it must be admitted, in all fairness, that Gilson's insistence on the necessity of the theological order of development in any genuinely Thomistic synthesis is a doctrine hard to bear. Certainly Father Hayen saw no urgent necessity to follow that order of development in his recent exposition of the philosophy of St. Thomas, *La Communication de l'être d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin*. Furthermore, there are many serious reasons why a modern Thomist should not employ this order in his dialogue with contemporary philosophers who know no order other than the philosophical approach to God through creatures. A number of these reasons have been cogently presented by Dr. James Collins in his excellent article, "Toward a Philosophically Ordered Thomism" (*New Scholasticism*, XXXII [July 1958], 301-26).

Against Gilson's theory of knowledge we find drawn up in battle array all the Thomists of the Marechalian tradition, who draw their inspiration from the more Augustinian and Platonic elements in Thomism which Gilson does not emphasize in his exposition of St. Thomas. Thomists of high repute, such as Lotz, Hayen, Marc, de Finance, and Coreth, whose influence is powerful in Europe, are living testimony to the fact that, in the opinion of many Thomists, the path to God and being begins within the human mind: and the metaphysics of inner experience and of the mind's drive to the changeless truth beyond the mutability of human sense and intellect is as much an element of the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas as it is of the wisdom of Augustine.

Perhaps this radical disagreement merely proves that the philosophy of the Angelic Doctor is too rich to be captured in its fulness by any Thomistic synthesis, even in one made by a historian as keen and penetrating as M. Gilson. But he himself would be willing to admit that fact, and this is why he urges us in *Le Philosophe et la théologie* not to become the slave of St. Thomas's commentators but to go beyond them to long and careful contemplation of the works of the saint himself. This, he says, is the true art of being a Thomist. Few can hope to practice it with the insight, urbanity, and synthetic power displayed by M. Gilson; but many, we are sure, will be helped and encouraged in their effort to acquire it by the splendid introduction to Christian philosophy provided by the three books discussed in this review.

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Our Experience of God. **By H. D. Lewis. New York: Macmillan Co., 1959. Pp. 302.**

H. D. Lewis is Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion at King's College in the University of London. He is also the present general editor of the "Muirhead Library of Philosophy" and recently personally edited the third series of *Contemporary British Philosophy.*

In a sense one could say that Professor Lewis's latest book, *Our Experience of God,* is a discussion, in a contemporary Anglo-American atmosphere, of the traditional problem of "God transcendent *versus* God immanent," or "the God of philosophy *versus* the God of religion." Lewis discusses the problem with a keen awareness of the emphasis that modern atheistic humanism, logical empiricism, and linguistic analysis put upon experience.

Lewis, of course, will not agree with the accusation which logical positivism throws at religion (namely, that its propositions are meaningless) or with that of many analysists, that it is the field par excellence where one falls into hopeless confusion of expression. Nor will he agree that there is any necessary opposition between the alternatives presented by the traditional problem. God, he everywhere insists, is transcendent; He is unique and incomprehensible. Indeed, the realization of the existence of a being who transcends our universe and is its source is the basic religious experience discussed throughout the book. But the book is also, and especially, dedicated to showing how from this experience emerge patterns that make one's whole personal, daily, life a religious one, so that God becomes most immanent, most personal, in His relations with us. The "beyond" is somehow also a "within." A "major theme" of the book is "the need for an enlivened personal apprehension of God and the guide and corrective which this supplies to beliefs and attitudes which become false by becoming stagnant" (p. 51).

In his opening chapter, Lewis is very insistent that religious expressions are meaningful; but he also thinks they should be reserved for activities and attitudes that involve some awareness of a transcendent being, for not every total commitment is a "religion."

In the next chapter we learn that Lewis believes that all of us can have, and most of us actually do have, an insight into the inevitability of the existence of some infinitely perfect, personal, uncaused, and unconditioned source of the real world that confronts us. However, he does not believe that the existence of God can be strictly demonstrated. We have the same certitude of God's existence as we do of truths in mathematics and logic;

only, we have no proof. In a single "leap of thought" we ascend to both the meaning and the inevitable being of the "infinite" and "underived" (pp. 60-61). Lewis speaks approvingly of the approach taken by his fellow-Welshman, Dom Illtyd Trethowan, who holds that we get to know the existence of God by looking "at what being stands for until it breaks into finite and infinite" (p. 43). Lewis is not prepared to accept the ontological argument; but his sympathies lean in its direction: "at the very heart of religion lies this quite unique notion of something of which we cannot conceive at all without seeing at the same time that it must be" (p. 44).

We come to know the truth of our personal religion through experiences which have this peculiarity about them that while they are themselves finite—that is, have a content appropriate only to finite things like ourselves—they nevertheless refer, and can be seen to refer, to something that is not finite (p. 58).

Life and man have come into being through an evolutionary process ("a matter largely beyond dispute" [p. 73]), and religion has a naturalistic origin. But, interestingly enough, Lewis believes that primitive religion was not polytheistic, that pluralistic forms of religion might well be corruptions of a more unified religious life.

Lewis, under the influence of Rudolf Otto, considers the sense of "the numinous" to be basic, insisting that this sense does not exist independently of all relation to the transcendent, contrary to what certain atheistic humanists contend.

In Chapter V, which deals explicitly with religious experience, Lewis first briefly discusses the affinities and differences between art and religion. Both give us a sense of the irreducible mystery of things; religion, however, arouses a special wonder peculiar to itself. Lewis then points out the circumstances that evoke this religious wonder and the internal or external crises which precipitate the leap which takes the mind beyond finite things. This experience, as we are shown in the next chapter, easily merges into other experiences, and one's life takes on a pattern of religious experience. Our sense of objectivity is reinforced. Our perceptiveness of the world around us is heightened. In particular, we appreciate better the distinctions to be made in ethical matters; we see their objective quality.

Chapter VII is given over to a discussion of the notions, images, and symbols that religion employs. Here Lewis takes exception to some of the theories advanced by Austin Farrer in *The Glass of Vision*. He also differs from Jung in the question of symbols. These are significant for religion only to the degree that they reflect a distinctively religious stand in experience, "enabling us to acquire firmer and more germinative over-all impres-

sions of the patterns of the occurrences in which the character of God is disclosed" (p. 145).

In Chapter VIII the role of theology is discussed, the theologian being likened to an art critic. Of the relations between philosophy and theology Lewis says:

> Philosophy is a good generator of theological thinking, and theology as we know it has been much encouraged and expedited by the meeting of marked philosophical thought with a sharp consciousness of a particular course which religion was taking, pre-eminently in the union of Greek philosophy and Hebrew-Christian experience (p. 154).

Most of Lewis's discussion of dogma concerns the dangers to which it exposes the religious soul. Indeed, he had earlier told us that "reactionary authoritarian dogmatism is the major menace of our civilization" (p. 38). What is central for religion is not dogma but living encounter and personal experience. There is no theme to which he wishes to give more prominence in the book than that "religion counts little without the sense of the presense of God" (p. 158).

Interesting chapters follow on the material factors in religion, on rites and ceremonies, on ascetical practices, on ornaments, instruments, sacred objects, music. Lewis cautiously discusses their relevance to religion and their help in evoking and sustaining religious experiences, though he is always anxious to point out the ways in which these can degenerate into magic and superstition. His discussion of the Christian sacraments is not satisfactory, as he does not sufficiently appreciate the doctrine of supernatural grace or the role of the sacraments as channels of this grace. He so stresses the effect of the sacraments that derives *ex opere operantis* that the effect deriving *ex opere operato* is ignored. For instance: "Even if the changes [for example, those involved in Transsubstantiation] are known to occur, their religious import is nil except in relation to what they help us to think and feel and do in our relations with God"; ". . . it is not enough to attach certain spiritual conditions to the efficacy of the material performances; we must also insist that the efficacy must itself be understood entirely in terms of changes in the mind or personality of those who participate in the sacrament—or perhaps those they may influence"; and, ". . . I should be reluctant to draw any absolute distinction between the ceremonies which are definitely sacramental and other forms of religious ritual" (pp. 183, 184).

The relations between art and religion, touched upon earlier, are explicitly discussed in Chapter XIII. Lewis is convinced that authentically religious imagery and symbolism must be rooted in traditional imagery.

There are two chapters on the preternatural, in which Lewis admits the

occurrence of preternatural phenomena but is very solicitous to point out the possibility of error and the care we must take not to put the essence of religion in the preternatural.

Then comes a chapter on miracles and on prayer in general, followed by a special chapter on petitionary prayer. Lewis discusses these matters honestly and cautiously. He has some fine remarks on the life of prayer.

Chapter XVIII is given over to a discussion of the relations between religion and morality. Naturally Lewis finds a very close connection between the two. Still, he emphatically rejects the idea that we can argue from the objectivity of ethics to the existence of God or to any other truth about Him. Indeed, to do so is to relegate God to a very remote, peripheral position, after the fashion of the deists, instead of having Him the live center of religion, encountered as the living voice of individual conscience, "a real person disclosing Himself in moral experience and expressly concerned about our conduct above all" (p. 267). Morality especially is the field where finite experience is "transmuted into the disclosures and operations of the transcendent within the world we know" (p. 268). In this chapter, Lewis takes occasion to point out how Christ on the cross shows the unlimited character of God's involvement in the world and how this gives assurance that suffering is not pointless.

A final chapter is dedicated to "encounter and immediacy." In this Lewis again stresses the idea that, though there is no absolutely immediate union possible with God, still encounter with the divine can be very personal and very common. He insists that Christians must try to induce a sense of immediacy by creating the social environment in which tradition may be rediscovered and perpetuated without becoming stale. He warns against letting religion become excessively institutionalized, and he ends the book with an exhortation that we be living witnesses to what Jesus was and did.

It is remarkable how much conviction Lewis derives from experiences, even though he does not have a solid metaphysics on which to support himself. He will not trust any discursive reasoning from a datum of experience up to God. But he has an all too common misconception in this regard, for he tells us that the traditional First Cause argument "invites the rejoinder that on our premiss that everything must have a cause [*sic!*], the alleged 'first cause' must have a cause as well" (p. 41). And with regard to how we know anything about the nature of God, Lewis mistrusts the doctrine of analogical knowledge; he believes that it "does not in fact yield anything" (p. 54; cf. p. 182). He has doubts about the existence of demons; he does not see how their existence could possibly be known. It is not clear whether Lewis denies common traditional teaching concerning the Fall, Original Sin, and allied doctrines or only rejects some exaggerated

expressions (cf. pp. 28, 62, 69-70, 88, 161, 163 and 172). We have already mentioned his misconceptions about the sacraments. He exaggerates the dangers of the institutionalization of religion and does not, in my opinion, show sufficient appreciation of the truth-value of dogmas and of corporate worship. He underestimates the role of genuine religious authority, which is not surprising, as he does not seem to believe that there has been a strict supernatural revelation given by God. In short, despite his empiricism, there is a quite pronounced strain of religious rationalism running through the work.

Lewis's method is in many ways admirable. The discussions are carried out in a sober, common-sense fashion, with an occasional slyly witty remark thrown in. He proceeds slowly and prudently, trying to see matters from all angles; he is constantly qualifying his concessions and leans over backwards to give no offense to the agnostics.

Lewis insists that the awareness of the transcendent is possible, probably easy, for everyone, even the simplest. Still, his own book is written on a very sophisticated level. Also, it is often unnecessarily obscure and vague. What does one really remember from sentences like these:

> If . . . it can be shown that religious events or processes, and the interplay of these with other factors of experience, have some patterns which encourage the belief that they represent the dealings with us in the matters of most concern to us of another personal Being, there is scope again for the excitation of the profoundest emotions according to the turn the relationship takes at particular times; and if, on the basis of the way this religious strand of men's experience as a whole has been woven, there are produced certain general notions about its significance which contain further possibilities of acute dramatic tension, these notions, both when they are warranted and when they are not, will bring additional emotional charges into outstanding religious occurrences (p. 118).

Or, again:

> . . . the vision, whether it be strictly a vision, like those of St. John of the Cross or St. Theresa, or some strange and exalted experience of which 'vision' is the nearest rough description we can give, has its main worth, not in what it is in relative detachment, but in the extension (and concentration too) of what has become significant in our own experience through appropriation into the fullness of our own life of what we find most distinctive in the religiously animated social existence of which we are a part (p. 234).

In spite of these criticisms, the book is worth while. It tries to meet

the gentiles" on their own grounds. Lewis wishes to be religious without sacrifice of intellectual integrity (p. 18), and in this he succeeds. He is a sincere and capable philosopher, and a sincere and practical Christian. He may not win converts to theism, but he will make it more respected in certain somewhat hostile quarters. Among believers his book should be the occasion of an enlivened religious experience.

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Philosophy of Labor. **By Remy C. Kwant, O.S.A. "Duquesne Studies, Philosophical Series," Vol. 10. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1960. Pp. xi + 163. $5.25.**

This book is both a criticism of the Marxian philosophy of labor and an attempt to formulate a philosophy that adequately expresses the "prevailing influence" of economic conditions upon human existence and, in particular, the effect of labor upon the social, political, and spiritual orders. On the one hand, the author criticizes the thesis that labor is an adequate starting-point of a philosophical system; on the other hand, he believes that philosophies that have not developed a philosophy of labor have failed in their task of creating a full philosophical expression of human life.

Although Father Kwant is unusually fair to Marx, he misrepresents the Marxian philosophy of labor in at least one important respect. In criticism of it, he argues that labor is not the absolute center of human life and that man's activities are too complex to be reduced to productive labor. Marx was not guilty of such a reduction, and even the author shows some doubt on this point in commenting upon the ambiguity in Marx's fundamental thesis of economic determinism. Since Marx argued that labor determines the rest of human life only as a necessary and not as a sufficient condition, his thesis that man produces his own life in a social way means that labor only "in the last analysis" is the center of human existence; hence there is no disagreement with Father Kwant's formulation that "the heart of history, the infrastructure is already a human phenomenon and as such implies all the essential characteristics of man." Obviously, economic or labor determinism—technology is itself a function of labor—does not explain all human phenomena.

One of the major contributions of this volume is its implicit distinction between the Marxian political economy of labor—which the author defends against its conventional critics, especially economists who still cling to the "ideology of profit"—and the Marxian philosophy of labor. The importance of this distinction lies in the fact that Marx's political economy of labor may serve as the foundation for other philosophies of labor besides a

dialectical materialist one. Although Father Kwant rightly insists that Marx's "metaphysics" is not the basis from which his philosophy starts but rather a development of it—Marx's philosophy of nature is an extension of his philosophy of social history—he also notes that the Marxian philosophy of labor contains materialistic presuppositions. These are rejected as inconsistent with a deeper existentialist conception of man, although he does not hesitate to incorporate the bulk of Marx's analysis and critique of capitalist relations of production into his own philosophy of labor. The influence of Marx's earlier writings, especially those showing traces of his Hegelian apprenticeship, is also evident throughout much of Father Kwant's book; namely, themes from Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* based upon the paradoxes of man's self-alienation in the labor process.

In Father Kwant's interpretation, a philosophy of labor is designed to answer such questions as: What are the paradoxes of labor? Are these paradoxes a necessary part of the labor process? What is the role of labor in human life? What are the stages in a philosophical history of labor? What is the nature of labor? What are its implications? Since these are not questions of concern to either economists or sociologists, it is the philosopher's task to answer them. However, one may question whether this book develops a philosophy of labor or a philosophy of work. Assuredly, it is a philosophy neither of, nor for, the labor movement in the sense of other works with a similar title, such as Delisle Burns's *The Philosophy of Labor*, and Frank Tannenbaum's *A Philosophy of Labor*. The author rejects the narrow meaning of the term "labor," which is practically coextensive with manual and technical work, in favor of its broader philosophical significance. Thus labor is defined as a human activity exercised according to common rules and common customs, implying the acceptance of a system of rights and duties that belong to the general social order. Although one implication of this definition is that all workers are laborers, it does not follow that all work is equally dignified or that labor, in the narrow sense, is not a travail. In this light, the book's central concern is the philosophy of work—in the tradition of Adriano Tilgher's *Work: What it has Meant to Men Trough the Ages* and Paul Schrecker's *Work and History*.

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Review of Renaissance Concepts of Methods. **By Neal Ward Gilbert. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1960. Pp. xxvi + 255. $6.00.**

Any perceptive reader of the primary sources in the area called modern philosophy (for example, the works of Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, and so on)

cannot but be struck by their critical views of the past coupled with their insistence on a new approach; in a word, on method. It is the intention of Gilbert to examine the intellectual climate, remote and proximate, in which these storms arise, for he is ". . . convinced that Renaissance discussions of method had not been sufficiently explored in their full breadth" (p. vii).

More concretely, this work takes its point of departure, first, from the researches of Ernst Cassirer on Zarbarella's two methods—the compositive and resolutive; and, secondly, from the work of John H. Randall, Jr., ". . . on the rise of scientific method in the school of Padua" (p. xiv). The author's own approach to these problems is characterized as that of the "historian of philosophy," to whom falls, he insists, "the analysis of ideas about *method* expressed by scientists" (p. xix) and nonscientists. This approach is contrasted, perhaps unjustly, with "the historian of science, who alone is qualified to judge of the contributions made to the techniques and concepts of a science by Galileo or any other scientist" (p. xix).

In order for his readers to maintain historical perspective throughout this work, Gilbert, aware that ". . . it is difficult to realize that the talk of method in the Renaissance may not have concerned *scientific method* in our modern sense at all" (p. xv), spells out the characteristics of "the modern 'scientific method.'" In this way the history of the question will not be read backwards but forward.

With this caveat, the task at hand is confronted with dividing ". . . the entire discussion of method into two large categories, that dealing with *artistic* method and that dealing with scientific method" (p. xxiv). The first is concerned with the teaching of the arts and with communication, and has its roots in the Socratic tradition. The other "was the contribution of Aristotle who developed explicit criteria of demonstrative procedure that went beyond what Socrates had demanded of an art and that represented, in a sense, a carrying out of the mathematical program of the older Plato" (p. xxv).

Fully cognizant of the Greek background (and sometimes medieval) of Renaissance discussions, Gilbert lays it bare with respect to these two schools of method. In Chapter 1 he discusses, first, the Greek sources of Renaissance discussions of methodology and then the medieval sources. The former includes Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Galen, and the Greek commentators on Aristotle. The medieval sources are the Latin commentaries on Aristotle. All this purports to be what the author calls "the history of the concept of method" (p. 39) and is followed in Chapter 2 by a discussion of the history of method as a philosophical term. This chapter recapitulates and supplements the information on Plato up to the

Greek commentators exposed in Chapter 1. Moreover, it adds discussions of *methodus* as a Latin philosophical term, humanist distaste for the term *methodus*, and Renaissance etymologies of this term.

Such a division and separation (into different chapters) of concept and term sets up an artificial and unnatural tension, leaving the reader with the impression that the concept of method is being discussed apart from the term and vice versa. Such an obscurity may well explain some disconcerting remarks on Aristotle (pp. 6-8). But this is not to say that these chapters are not stocked with all sorts of interesting information. Of special interest is the section devoted to Galen, whose influence on scientific methodology is just now being generally recognized. Also the discussion of geometrical method in the Greek commentators, though brief, can help to deepen the significance of Descartes's reading of Pappus of Alexandria.

All the varieties of these ancient discussions on method—*methodos*, *techne*, *methodus*, *via*, *via doctrinae*, *ordo doctrinae*, *ars*, *analysis*, *resolutio*, *synthesis*, *compositio*—find their way into the Renaissance and the humanist movement for reform in education. More especially, this reform centered on method in teaching and "insistence on speed is typical of the Humanists: the arts must be learned 'as quickly as possible'. In a phrase favorite with them, the Humanists had no intention of 'growing old and gray in the study of logic', or in any of the other arts" (p. 71). Thus the author charts this humanist wave as it engulfs logic, grammar and rhetoric, history, the quadrivium (especially geometry), law, medicine, and theology. Its products were those compendia, epitomes, brief arts, resumes, much lamented by those who clearly saw them as "endangering the serious mastery of subject matter" (p. 114). On a larger scale, the impact of this humanist reform was no less profound:

> In short, the influence of Humanism in this medical methodology resembles its influence in other fields: doctrines which purported to rest on authority must be shown by conclusive linguistic textual grounds to be supported by a passage in the sources, in the original language. This meant the shifting of philosophical discussion from the presentation and refutation of arguments to the scholarly examination of classical passages. Medieval exposition, which was a mixture of philosophical examination and scholarly quotation, or *ratio* and *auctoritas*, was beginning to yield to a division of labor in which the authorities were left to the scholar and reasoning to the philosopher" (p. 107).

Thus we are here confronting, to a degree, what is present in our day—the absence of philosophy and philosophizing to its history and vice versa.

This influence of humanism on philosophy is "dealt with in the second part of this study" (p. 114). Though "all the subjects that made up academic philosophy (i.e. those subjects dealt with by Aristotle in the *Organon* and in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Metaphysics* and natural philosophy) could and did give rise to methodological discussions" (p. 115), Gilbert studies the two methodological traditions as they come "to grips in logic or dialectic" (p. 120). More exactly, he concerns himself with the development of method as a topic in the textbooks of the "'dialecticians'—those Humanistically oriented writers who emphasized the finding part of dialectic and its utility in speaking and reasoning" (p. 120). As "to the other school of methodological thought (the scientific), we cannot give such thorough attention, for its examination would carry us back into the thirteenth century" (p. 121).

The dialecticians who are studied explicitly are Melanchthon, but briefly, and Peter Ramus, more extensively. The latter is characterized as one of the outstanding methodologists of the arts for his espousal and defense of the "single method." Indeed, Ramus has been the subject of a recent profound study by Father Walter J. Ong, S.J., which was not in print when Gilbert was doing his research. Thus, in our day this is evidence that the dialogue on Ramus, at least, has not fallen into decay.

Gilbert treats in some detail the position of Ramus with its dominant emphasis on the *ordo doctrinae* (pp. 142-43) and juxtaposes it alongside the violent reactions of the Peripatetics, the most determined of whom is Carpentarius. For this man "takes Ramus to task for neglecting the method by which arts are originally investigated at the expense of the manner in which an art already discovered is disposed" (p. 148). In addition, the opposition of Bartolomeo Viotti, a medical Aristotelian, and of Jacob Schegk to Ramus is plotted.

In contrast with these storms which whirl north of the Alps, the climate in Italy is calm and serene and "the traditional authorities remained in esteem" (p. 164). In this tranquil atmosphere, Gilbert discusses Ludovicus Buccaferrea, Jacopo Zarbarella, Francesco Piccolomini, and Jacobus Mazzonius, who are in the tradition "set by Averroes and the Scholastics" (p. 180). A "non-Scholastic trend" is exposed in Giacomo Aconzio, Girolamo Borro, Giulio Pace, and Scipione Chiaramonti.

And in the midst of all these discussions on the Contingent, England listened, heeding the call of Ramus or the critics of the "single method." The volume ends on a note of uneasy peace with an examination of Bartholomew Keckermann, "a conciliator and reconciler of the two main traditions of methodology" (p. 220).

Out of these immense labors of research, having culled texts from all sorts of works difficult to find and, once found, difficult to read and under-

stand (all of which puts future scholars of this question in his debt), Gilbert draws his general conclusion:

> So far as practical effect upon methods of scientific investigation goes, the result of these long and wordy controversies was minimal, although in a few fields of thought the arts methodology laid the grounds for the revamping of techniques of exposition, for instance, in law or history. So far as theoretical effect goes, there is no question but that in reviving the subject of method and in studying the philosophical works of the ancients, these Renaissance scholars were setting up a demand for a method which was to be answered, in the form of philosophical programs, in the next century, and were also furnishing some hints from classical thought which do not altogether disappear from view even though the seventeenth century did not care either to mention or to read what their predecessors had written on the subject" (p. 231).

FRANCIS C. WADE, S.J., *Marquette University*

The School Examined: Its Aim and Content. **By Vincent Edward Smith. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1960. Pp. xiii + 300. $5.75.**

This is a philosophical consideration of the school, though the author's view is that "because philosophy as such knows utterly nothing of the Christian or supernatural dimension," the book is, "properly speaking, theological rather than philosophical" (p. viii). One could just as well say that because the principles controlling the analysis are discovered and defended by reason, the book is philosophical rather than theological. The philosophy in question is that of a student of Aristotle and St. Thomas. The school in question is the liberal arts college first of all, and the high school and grade school as preparatory to college.

The first controlling principle is the nature of human knowledge, which is abstractive and progresses from a confused notion of a thing to a more definite notion. Progress in knowledge uses induction and syllogism, the discursive means of knowing. The teacher, whose art helps the student acquire more precise knowledge, will imitate nature by using these discursive means. Thus "the primary function of a teacher is to teach" knowledge (p. 35), though his moral influence is undoubtedly great; and "with all these qualifications, it can be argued that the aim of the school is an intellectual one" (p. 37). More precisely, it is to help the student put discursive order into his knowledge. Consequently, "if a subject is teachable to the extent of involving discourse, and if science (in Aristo-

telian sense) involves the most perfect kind of discourse, science alone is perfectly teachable" (p. 42). Other modes of discourse—dialectical, rhetorical, literary—are less perfectly so, and thus their subjects are less teachable.

The second controlling principle is that the nature of knowledge is determined by the object and the consequent order among knowledges arising from the object known. Some objects are known for the sake of knowing and generate speculative or liberal science; some are known for the sake of doing or making and generate practical science. Among the objects of liberal science, three sorts of formal objects are known: material things able to be sensed; things as having intelligible matter; things as being, whether material or immaterial. In each of these sorts of liberal science there will be one science dealing with first principles; and all other sciences treating the same formal object will be a detailed and specialized consideration, with no first principles of their own. Thus the natural sciences will all be extensions under the general science (philosophy) of nature, just as "mathematics is one basic discipline, primarily arithmetical in character" (p. 84).

By employing these two principles the scientific order among knowledges with the same formal object is determined. First come the knowledges dealing with the first principles and afterwards the knowledges that are progressively more specialized. The third controlling principle, the pedagogical, determines the order in which various classes of sciences should be learned. The order of discovery is from the easy to the difficult. The easy is what is already known in experience. Thus the pedagogical principle is that "sciences requiring little experience should be taught first, those demanding more should be deferred, and the science presupposing the maximum experience should be left to the end of the pedagogical order" (p. 90).

In the light of these principles the author sets up the following order among the disciplines. First come the logical arts: logic, grammar, and rhetoric. Logic precedes the scientific study of language, because it supplies the principles that unify the language arts (p. 105). Second come the mathematical arts: arithmetic (and algebra), geometry (and trigonometry and analysis), applications of mathematics to being with periodic motions. Mathematics comes after logic because it deals with constructions about the real world, whereas logic deals with mental constructions (p. 131). Third come the physical sciences: general science (philosophy of nature), physics, chemistry, biology. General science lays down the first principles of mobile being, and the study of the soul supplies the first principles of living being (p. 162). Fourth come the social sciences, which demand more experience on the part of the learner than

do the natural sciences. The social sciences are ethics (laying down the principle, the end of man), political science, sociology, economics. They are all practical because there is always a question of good or bad concerning their objects. History is not strictly a science but is necessary to enlarge the experience on which ethics and the other social sciences are grounded and is thus reductive to "ethical knowledge as part of its preparation" (p. 205).

Fifth comes metaphysics, which gives shape to the liberal college as being the wisdom in which all natural learning culminates. It is reserved to the end of the curriculum "because it requires the maximum of experience; it requires the calmness of emotion as aided by ethics" (p. 236). Also, metaphysics relies on the general science (philosophy) of nature to prove by reason there is an immaterial being (p. 227) and to see most clearly the analogy of being (p. 229). Metaphysics integrates all the other sciences as a final cause does and lights up their first principles, defends the principle of non contradiction, and bestows its liberality on all liberal sciences which prepare for it. Sixth and last comes sacred theology, dealing with God and all things as related to God. Theology is the most certain of knowledges, because its first principles are revealed; it is the most liberal, because their is no science beyond it (p. 261). The proper order of theological topics is that of St. Thomas's *Summa Theologiae*. All prescientific knowledge prepares for the sciences and all sciences prepare for theology as the top Christian wisdom (p. 286).

This brief review of the movement of the book indicates the insight that generated it. This insight is that for each area of scientific knowledge there is one which deals with first principles and which by rights should come first. Isolating the skeleton of the book does not, of course, give any notion of the color of the flesh. Though there "are many practical problems, untouched in this more general discussion" (p. 289), the number of problems, both speculative and practical, that are treated is enormous. Most of the problems that move around in the school get shot at. A few samples will makes this clear.

"All the great errors in the history of ideas involve a misconception or misuse of logic" (p. 17); religious knowledge is not "an affair of indoctrination" (p. 20); "stimulation of need, puzzle problems, or as Plato and Aristotle said, wonder, normally requires dialectical activity by a teacher" (p. 56); logic is "only reductively liberal, liberal in the use to which it is put, namely the pursuit of wisdom" (p. 67); "the moral virtues of the citizen are not the end of the liberal curriculum" (p. 72); "if there is one direct preparation for metaphysics that can be achieved in precollege years, it is in figurative art" (p. 103; "mechanism is usually associated with an overemphasis on the sense of sight" (p. 114); mathe-

matics is not a language, though it "has a language, a grammar, a syntax of its own" (p. 124); mathematics is "perfect in giving us exhaustive knowledge" (p. 128); mathematical physics is not "a basic discipline. It is a science in a derivative and secondary sense. It is a hybrid discipline" (p. 132); "non-Euclidian geometries are dialectical" (p. 139); "speculation becomes practical by extension" (p. 185); a truly scientific ethics can be anchored in a "vague and somewhat indeterminate end, albeit a certain one" (p. 190); the real distinction is not scientifically known to be universal "until we show that in God alone are essence and existence identified" (p. 234); without theology taught as a science and wisdom "the college curriculum will not be integrated in an orderly Christian way" (p. 280).

Here are some practical positions: "logic has been too closely identified with the philosophy program of the modern college" (p. 109); possibly "we have not pushed mathematical physics down far enough into the curriculum but have reserved it mostly for college" (p. 142); it is good "to regard nature study in the grades as a kind of natural history" (p. 180); if for reasons of administration "sociology, economics, and politics must be introduced before a formal course in ethics can be squeezed in, these modern social sciences can no longer be viewed in a synthetic and scientific amplitude, with no perspective of first principle, they cannot be taught as sciences" (pp. 221-222); engineering or agriculture or home economics cannot "be taught liberally" (p. 248); "a truly liberal college today might be a rarity. And perhaps this is the way it should be" (p. 247); we might decide "that metaphysics is not for everybody" (p. 253); if sacred doctrine were learned well in high school, we would use "Part I of the *Summa* as the basis for a freshman course, Part II as the meat of sophomore and junior programs, and Part III as the senior subject" (p. 282).

The strength of Professor Smith's examination of the school is that it employs the norms of the disciplines themselves, not some extraneous norms that happen to appeal to the examiner. Subjects known on the level of science make their own demands, since it is these which are to be understood. This fact cannot be repeated too often in our day, when accrediting agencies love to analyze (and approve) schools in terms of the *end proposed*, as if the end of the school were purely a matter of *proposal* and not also a matter of knowing subjects the way subjects demand to be known. One who reads Professor Smith need not have that problem again.

Besides the demands of the subject known are the concomitant demands of the knowing act itself: that learning go from the easy to the difficult; that what requires less experience come before what requires more experience. These principles are given a place in this examination, but they

do not seem to operate evenly. For instance, they are decisive in the case of metaphysics, which is put late in the curriculum; they are not operative when logic precedes rhetoric. They are operative in the very plan of the book, for the author holds that since metaphysics shapes the school on the natural level, "we might have begun by defining wisdom" (p. 226)—instead he begins with the easier notions of communication and teaching. They are not operative when Part I of the *Summa* is taken as the basis for the freshman theology course. The reader wonders why such principles operate so unevenly. It may be that the author is not fully convinced that science is as rampant among college students as good opinion.

The main problem in carrying out an analysis with two sets of principles is to get some norm for their joint application to one set of facts. And this problem becomes especially acute whenever the data analyzed includes essential and existential factors, both equally critical. In such cases, and the actual school is such, it is not quite enough to decide that in this area of the curriculum the essential principles will control and in that the existential principles will. Both must be operative in each area and, quite probably, differently in different areas. And to sort out the proper influences of both sets of principles would seem to require a more detailed consideration than this present book provides.

What it does provide is a significant consideration of the essential demands that arise from the subjects themselves. Even those who may disagree with Professor Smith about this or that essential relation between this or that subject owe him a debt of gratitude for this present examination of the school. And philosophers who wish to continue work on this problem will find helpful his frequent references to the writings of St. Thomas.

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The Mirror of Philosophers. **By Martin Versfeld. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1960. Pp. 301. $5.75.**

Martin Versfeld is a professor of philosophy at the University of Capetown. This is the second of his books to be published in the United States, the present volume having been preceded by his *A Guide to the City of God* in 1958. We sincerely hope he has more in store for us.

By his own admission, this is a book more constructed than written. Substantially it is a collection of previous articles somewhat modified and put into order by connective passages to give us several philosophical themes with enough autobiographical material thrown in to exemplify the thesis that the philosopher is the man. This South African Chesterton is a humanist as well as a philosopher and he knows how to use many

mirrors. He is not, however, an illusionist; the burden of the main argument which lies behind the title is that not concepts but things are the true images of reality—Being Itself is mirrored in beings.

Cartesian rationalism is the devil let loose in modern philosophy. Professional philosophers will want to ponder Versfeld's accusing Kierkegaard of Cartesianism in the chapter "Kierkegaard and Metaphysics" and his linking of the antirationalism of Nietzsche, Dostoievsky, and Chestov with Descartes by way of modern science, whose foundation he laid (see p. 196). This theme is developed in "*Physis* and *Nomos*" with a critique of modern science, while in the chapter "Leon Chestov" we have a fascinating exposé of the thought of that little-known modern apostle of the irrational.

Among the twenty-two chapters, or essays, there are pieces on the nature of philosophy, existentialism, atheism, the idea of progress, agreement among philosophers, and—worthy of special mention—a piece on Comte, "The Goddess of Humanity," and a philosophic penetration of Marlowe's *Faustus* called "The Pool of Narcissus."

The concluding chapters are devoted to St. Thomas Aquinas. Professor Versfeld has an enjoyable literary style characterized by liberal use of paradox and elegant punning. In the final chapters allusiveness and rhetoric become so turgid as to almost drown the thought. This is, withal, a book of brilliant insights which also contains many statements of basic Thomism so well written that teachers of philosophy will want to recommend them to their students (see pp. 270 f., for act of existence, knowledge; pp. 278 f., the virtue of magnanimity). To obtain the proper stimulation this book should be taken in small doses.

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. **Vol. XIII, No. 1. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1960. Pp. 116. Annual subscription, DM 36.**

After a lapse of twenty-seven years, the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* is again active, now edited by Paul Wilpert of Cologne, with the co-operation of Glenn Morrow of Philadelphia. The last editor of the original series, Arthur Stein (son of the founder), gave his rights in the journal to the present editor. Hence, this new publication can be legitimately looked on as a continuation, particularly inasmuch as it intends to follow in the spirit of the original journal.

The first number contains three articles: "Religion and Natural Philosophy in Empedocles' Doctrine of the Soul," by Charles H. Kahn; "Die Entwicklung der Dialektik bei Petrus Ramus," by Wilhelm Risse; and "Natural Belief and the Enigma of Hume," by Ronald J. Butler. There are also two long book reviews: the first of W. G. Rabinowitz's *Aristotle's 'Protrepticus' and the Sources of Its Reconstruction*, reviewed by Paul Wilpert; the second, of Averroes' *Tahafut al-Tahafut*, translated and annotated by Simon van den Bergh, reviewed by Marion Soreth.

The first issue is a realization of the ideal which the editor proposes and likewise gives rise to the hope that the new series will win a wide acceptance.

G. P. K.

Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie im ersten Drittel des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, II. **By Gerhard Lehmann. "Sammlung Goschen," Vol. 850. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1960. Pp. 114. Paper, DM 3.60.**

The treatment of twentieth-century philosophy in this volume is covered under two headings: phenomenology and ontology, and the movement from pragmatism to neorealism. Under the first heading, there are brief accounts of Brentano, Rehmke, Driesch, Husserl, von Pauler, Scheler, von Meinong, Pichler, Janssen, Hartmann, and Jacoby. Under the second, Schiller, James, Dewey, Watson, and Russell. Each section begins with an introduction and concludes with a selective bibliography.

Lehmann has a gift of easy compression and so manages to give a thorough account in very brief compass. Even when he seems somewhat unsympathetic, as in the discussion of Husserl, he remains fair and balanced.

G. P. K.

Humanismo y Mundo Moderno. **Trans. Jose Oroz, O.R.S.A. Madrid: Libreria Editorial Augustinus, 1960. Pp. 321. 100 pesetas.**

This is a series of conferences, held under the auspices of "Studium Christi" in Rome and first published in Italian in two volumes, *Umanesimo e Mondo Moderno* and *Umanesimo e Mondo Contemporaneo*. The general purpose of these conferences was to help men find a more harmonious unity for their lives by reconsidering the function of humanism in today's world. The particular aspects treated are easily understood from the titles of the papers which are thirteen in number. They are the following: "Interpretación del Humanismo del Renacimiento," by Giuseppe Toffanin (pp. 13-33); "El Humanismo y el Pensamiento Protestante," by Mario Bendiscioli (pp. 35-64); "El Humanismo y la Filosofia Moderna," by Cornelio Fabro (pp. 65-95); "La Filosofia de Blondel y el Humanismo Cristiano," by Michele Federico Sciacca (pp. 97-111); "El Hombre del Existencialismo," by Cornelio Fabro (pp. 113-36); "El humanismo de la Esperanza y de la Fidelidad en Gabriel Marcel," by Regis Jolivet (pp. 137-52); "Problemas Modernos y Perspectivas Humanistico-Cristianas," by Giuseppe Gemmellaro (pp. 153-91), "Premisas Biologicas para el Estudio de la Persona Humana," by Mario Torrioli (pp. 193-203); "Exigencias Humanas en la Economia Contemporanea," by Francesco Vito (pp. 205-28); "La Persona Humana y la Experiencia Juridica," by Aldo Moro (pp. 229-46); "La Pedagogia del Humanismo Contemporaneo," by Aldo Agazzi (pp. 247-70); "Las Ciencias y la Filosofia en un Humanismo Cristiano," by Carlo Giacon, S.J. (pp. 271-93); and "La Sintesis Cristiana de los Valores del Hombre Moderno," by Raimondo Spiazzi, O.P. (pp. 295-319).

The translator has written a brief introduction, pointing out the importance of the general problem; he has also given a biographical and bibliographical notice for each of the contributors.

G. P. K.

Libre arbitre et jugement. **By Joseph Lebacqz, S.J. Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1960. Pp. 164. Paper, 120 f.b.**

The problem discussed here is technically a Scholastic one, though in a larger sense it touches on the basic view of man. The problem is, How is

the act of freedom to be thought of? The investigation begins with Aristotle, who seems to have considered it an act of both intellect and will; his commentators divided the acts of intellect and will, and explained freedom as an act of choice preceded by an act of the intellect. The early history of this problem is then traced in the Latin West, with its culmination seen in the writings of St. Thomas. In these writings, the author finds an unresolved difference of texts (election is one act; it is an act of will preceded by an act of intellect), which he maintains cannot be solved by a chronological investigation, since he thinks to find both expressions even in the *Summa Theologiae*. Then he follows the discussions of the commentators on St. Thomas, concluding that their controversies over this problem are insoluble. He contrasts this doctrine with that of Blondel, who did not distinguish intellect and will as two faculties.

In the second section of the book, the author discusses the proofs for the real distinction of intellect and will, and concludes that they are not demonstrative. In his third section, he proposes, instead of a distinction of faculties, a distinction of three stages of finite activity: tendency, adaptation, acquisition; the second corresponds to cognition; the third to volition. Next, he distinguishes degrees of development in these stages, holding that every act of knowledge is followed by an act of will (quoting the adage, "Every form is followed by an inclination"), if not to the object, then to the knowledge of the object. He is then led to two types of judgment: one which discerns and another which decides. Thus, he can finally assert that one sort of judgment, the "ultimate practical judgment," is itself the act of choice. Finally, he comes back to the problem of the distinction of faculties. He does not want to hold a simple real distinction or a pure and simple identity. He finally attempts to state a real distinction of two powers which taken together make up one power of activity: one is the principle of specification, the other of exercise.

That there is a real problem in the analysis of freedom is shown quite clearly. Next, the author is successful in showing that any attempt to view intellect and will as distinguished equally (*ex aequo*) leads to untenable consequences, and to make the choice follow the last practical judgment in time also leads to such consequences. In considering the text of St. Thomas still obscure and confused, the author is aware that Dom Lottin has indicated a development and even a formal reconsideration of the nature of choice. It seems almost as if, like most of the commentators, he cannot take St. Thomas seriously; he knows and repeats the words "formal" and "material causality," and takes this to be efficient causality. If the aternatives are efficient causality between faculties or their nondistinction, there seems little to be gained either way.

G. P. K.

Mathématiques et métaphysique chez Descartes. **By Jules Vuillemin. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960. Pp. 188. Paper, NF 16.**

Professor Vuillemin is already well known for his two historical studies on the physics of Kant and that of the neo-Kantians in relation to recent physical theories. He tells us that he began the present study also as an account of Cartesian physics. However, he found sufficient wealth of new materials in the area of Cartesian mathematics and its bearing on philosophy to justify a separate work.

His originality derives from using Descartes's mathematical writings as a basis for reinterpreting aspects of his doctrines on method and metaphysics. A close analysis is made of those remarks in Descartes's *Geometry* which can be generalized and applied to the philosophy. But the author also noticed that Descartes's correspondence is a rich source for discovering how he treated of some logarithmic curves which could not be accommodated in the *Geometry* but for which he found a treatment, using logarithms as a kind of anticipation of the infinitesimal calculus. Thus a whole group of Descartes's letters are now seen to have mathematical and philosophical significance.

On the philosophical side, Vuillemin's researches furnish us with a more precise meaning for the general method of order and proportion. We can classify and order the particular arguments in Cartesian metaphysics somewhat after the fashion of classifying kinds of equations, using their degree of distance from the prime certitude of the *Cogito* as the basal measure. Other stimulating mathematical comparisons are found for the methodic rule of making frequent enumerations and reviews, as well as for the notion of achieving a continuous reflective movement for all parts of philosophy. By bringing the mathematical and metaphysical aspects of Descartes's mind closer together, Vuillemin has fulfilled his aim of clarifying Descartes the philosopher by means of a study of Descartes the savant.

J. C.

Metafisica e Spiritualisti Italiani Contemporanei. **By Sante Alberghi. Milan: Marzorati Editore, 1960. Pp. 317. L. 2,400.**

One of the strongest and most prolific tendencies in present-day Italian philosophy is the philosophy of the spirit. Until now, most of the expositions have been made either by the leading proponents themselves or by general historians describing this movement along with several others. The Alberghi book fills the need for an orderly survey devoted entirely to philosophy of the spirit and a survey long enough to bring out the different contributions of its leaders in a balanced way.

The first hundred pages consist of a sinuous description of the cultural and philosophical situation leading up to this philosophy. A review is made of the various attempts made especially in Italy to provide a satisfactory human ideal centered around civic duty at one extreme and the subjective life of art at the other. But our interior life cannot be satisfied with devotion to the common temporal good, and neither can it find its capacity for transcendence realized in the forms of art. Hence the perspective of a religiously oriented metaphysics is opened precisely by the frustrations of modern social and private existence. The author then makes a sharp criticism of Groce and Gentile for concentrating too exclusively upon immanence, whether in the mode of rationality or in that of act. One feature of this book is its stress upon the shortcomings of previous Italian idealism, whereas most commentators on philosophy of the spirit emphasize its continuity with the idealistic positions.

Long individual chapters are then devoted to each of the leaders in philosophy of spirit: Carlini, Guzzo, Sciacca, Stefanini, and Battaglia. In the study on Armando Carlini, the point is clearly made that he regarded Maurice Blondel as the master who showed him how to revise Gentile's immanentist actualism and thus to open up the analysis of spirit to the relationship with a personal God. This excellent account of a contemporary European philosophy concludes with an exhaustive, ten-page bibliography of the relevant publications, including articles.

J. C.

Die Natur des Menschen. **By Georg Siegmund. Wirzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1955. Pp. 167.**

Human nature is here considered from the viewpoint of the relations between philosophy and medicine. The author begins his presentation by showing through examples the insufficiency of a purely Positivistic science of man. Next, he shows that modern medicine is making many efforts to treat man as a whole, though often such efforts consist in replacing an exaggerated dualism of mind and body with a monism. This way of viewing man is equally unsatisfactory; so the author proposes instead that doctors view the soul as the "form-principle" of man. On the basis of the unity of man there is to be a "Ganzheits-Medizin," which seems unfortunately to be too similar to the so-called "Ganzheits-Biologie" proposed by some philosophical biologists. Doctors are not to split the treatment into two parts, the psychic and the somatic, but what is proposed instead seems at times to be a sort of psychological "naturopathy." A calm and reasonable control over the passions seems to be his formula for health of body as well as soul. The norm of nature thus conceived is used to criticize

the work of Kinsey (who is also said to have neglected biology in favor of sociology), psychiatric treatment based on Positivistic or materialistic assumptions, and some faulty views of matrimony. In the final chapter, glowing accounts of life among the Hunsa are used as examples to solve problems that arise in matrimony.

G. P. K.

Orientazioni Metafisiche. **By Aimé Forest. Trans. Italo Gotta. Milan: Marzorati, 1960. Pp. 139. Paper, L. 1,800.**

The Institute of Philosophy of the University of Genoa, under the direction of Professor Sciacca, has sponsored the publication of original works and also translations of writings of authors whose thought is akin to that of Italian Christian spiritualism. The present volume belongs to this series and consists of periodical articles and lectures of Aimé Forest of the University of Montpellier translated from the French into excellent Italian. The book is divided into two parts, of which the first is made up of five studies in the history of philosophy. The second part has five essays in a more speculative vein. The editor has selected for translation historical articles which discover spiritual relationships between such French thinkers of different periods as Pascal and St. Bernard, Biran and Le Senne, Malebranche and Lavelle. In the other studies of the first part, Forest takes the view that idealism is one philosophy which preserves interiority as the distinctive character of spirit, and he reflects at length on the notion of philosophy as prayer (*una filosofia orante*), a thought inspired by Blondel in *La Pensée* and *L'Action*. The second part of the book contains short writings on topics of common interest for the French philosophers of spirit and subjectivity, and for the Genovese group. Art and metaphysics, the sense of order, the meaning of dialogue, communication, and grace and liberty are the subjects of Forest's further reflections. Though the volume is not highly technical in a philosophical way, it offers much of value and interest to the Italian-speaking philosophical public.

L. A. B.

The Philosophy of Mathematics. **By Stephan Körner. London: Hutchison Univ. Library, 1960. Pp. 198. 12/6.**

The present volume belongs to the series published by the Hutchison University Library on philosophical subjects, and its author is one of the leading British analytic philosophers. By way of introduction a brief historical sketch of the views of Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, and Kant is

presented. Then the author discusses the three leading philosophical programmes for the reconstruction of classical mathematics, logicism, formalism, and intuitionism, dedicating a whole chapter to exposition and another to criticism of each of these three systems. Körner analyzes them from three aspects. First he asks how each one envisages the general structure and function of the propositions and theories of pure mathematics; secondly, how they view applied mathematics with its peculiar propositions and theories; and lastly he investigates the role of the notion of infinity in each. The final chapter of the volume is an original essay on the nature of pure and applied mathematics.

As one might expect, none of the traditional schools of mathematics satisfies completely the author's conception of an adequate philosophy of mathematics. In developing his own philosophy, Körner makes use of what he calls "the logic of exact and inexact concepts." As regards pure mathematics he maintains that the concepts and propositions of any mathematical theory are purely exact; that is, disconnected from perception. The propositions of applied mathematics, or the application of pure mathematics, represent the results of the interchanging of perceptual and purely exact statements. The technique of the so-called logic of exact and inexact concepts is clearly presented, and it enables the author to cope with the problem of the relation of mathematics to perception to his own satisfaction. Some of this matter he had discussed previously in a recent book, *Conceptual Thinking* (Dover Publications, New York, 1959) and in an article, "Determinables and Resemblance" (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supp. Vol. XXXIII, 1959).

For the most part Körner avoids metaphysical questions and follows a plan of analysis. In presenting the historical introduction and in his study of the various schools of mathematics, he claims to use "replacement-analysis." In developing his personal theories he employs what he calls "exhibition-analysis."

Although this book is of an introductory nature, to understand it to any degree a certain mathematical sophistication is needed. As a concession perhaps to his nonmathematical readers the author uses a minimum of mathematical and logical notation, and he uses such simple mathematical propositions as "$1 + 1 = 2$" and "one apple and one apple make two apples" in pursuing his analysis.

L. A. B.

Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie. **Vol. IV. Salzburg, Austria: Anton Pustet, 1960. Pp. 280. Paper.**

This fourth volume consists of four major studies, a section of miscellaneous reports and discussion, some book reviews, and indices. The first article, by Dom Beda Thum, O.S.B., "Wertphilosophie und Metaphysik," deals with some problems raised by the philosophy of values. The author points out that the recent insistence on the ideality of values would seem to remove them from the realm of being, a consequence which some value theorists have not failed to draw. He tries to rejoin value and being by a twofold analysis, one of the "good," according to which good is an attribute of being, and even moral good is a fullness of being, and the other of appetition, in which he stresses the willing of self in all willing. The second article, by Dom Maternus Hoegen, O.S.B., "Das Sein und der Mensch bei Martin Heidegger," is an extensive investigation of Heidegger's views on being, existence, and related ideas (pp. 29-112). The author begins with the epistemological and methodological presuppositions of Heidegger, mainly a study of his meaning of "phenomenology." Next comes a study of the existential experience as a being in the world. This is followed by an analysis of the world as experienced reality, its biological and ontological structures. From this consideration arises an analysis of experienced being: existence as the exemplar of being as distinguished from essence, its characteristics as deriving from the world as a whole, its necessarily historical and mysterious nature, which yet can reveal only what is immanent in it. The final section deals with the metaphysical level of the problem of being. Here the author looks for a solution in a dynamic view of being as act, in which *esse* is activity or perhaps better "super-activity." The third paper, by Franz Furger, "Die Struktureinheit der Wahrheit bei Karl Jaspers," is a very formal analysis of Jaspers's ideas on truth. All these various ideas are compared with each other, classified, and schematized. In addition, various connected problems are discussed: error, knowledge of God, and so forth. The fourth paper, by Dom Albert Auer, O.S.B., "Naturrechtsdenken im heutigen Protestantismus," is a very useful survey of current views, with detailed bibliographical references. Though the study is restricted almost entirely to German publications, much of this discussion has been carried on by them, and they are more likely to be unknown to other students of the natural law.

G. P. K.

Soziologie. Geschichte und Hauptprobleme. **By Leopold von Wiese. "Sammlung Goschen," Vol. 101. 6th ed. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1960. Pp. 175. Paper, DM 3.60.**

This edition contains new footnote material and a new tenth chapter, dealing with general sociology in Germany since 1955; the rest of the material is a corrected reprinting of the edition of 1954.

The approach is mainly historical. The first chapter treats of the nature of sociology as a study of the happenings that take place among men. The second chapter considers the origin of sociology as a science. The third indicates the various divisions and trends. Chapters Four to Nine take up the historical development in France, Britain and America, and in Germany.

In spite of its brevity, this work is thorough and could serve as an excellent introduction to general sociology, especially for one who did not intend to specialize in that field.

G. P. K.

Studi in Onore di M. F. Sciacca. **Ed. M. T. Antonelli and M. Schiavone. Milan: Marzorati Editore, 1959. Pp. 248.**

This is one of several *Festschriften* presented to the Italian Catholic philosopher, M. F. Sciacca, on the occasion of his twentieth year of university teaching. All but two of the fourteen contributors are non-Italians —an impressive testimonial to Sciacca's international stature. He has lectured frequently in France and Spain, and the *Giornale di Metafisica* which he edits has a wide circulation in Europe and Latin America. The only contribution in English is A. R. Caponigri's essay on the proof of God's existence drawn from the nature of truth, a favorite approach used by Sciacca. Caponigri casts the argument into loosely syllogistic form. "There is nothing in man or in the world superior to mind; the mind intuits immutable and absolute truths which are superior to it; *therefore:* the absolute immutable Truth, which is God, exists." Almost all the other essays converge eventually upon this inference. Its Augustinian background is discussed by W. Eborowicz; its descriptive location within a philosophy of interiority is a theme developed by Aimé Forest and others; and the problems which it raises concerning the mind's capacity for transcending its interiority are considered by Gallo Galli. Teachers of philosophy who are looking for a modern presentation of the argument from truth will find it here, along with some sympathetic criticisms which keep within the bounds of philosophy of the spirit.

J. C.

Studi sulla Coscienza Etica e Religiosa del Seicento: Esperienza e Liberta in J. Locke. **By Romeo Crippa. Milan: Marzorati Editore, 1960. Pp. 163. L. 1,200.**

Crippa makes a fresh reading of Locke which challenges some of the conventional interpretations. He comes to Locke with a twofold preparation distinguishing him from the older commentators. First, his own philosophical background is that of the Italian philosophy of spirit; second, he uses the biographical and philosophical materials on Locke which were first published in the nineteen-fifties. Predictably, the result is a new and stimulating view of Locke's significance.

For one thing, the main stress is not placed upon the epistemology of the *Essay* but upon the moral and religious thoughts expressed in Locke's other writings. This accords with the Lockean purpose of using the way of ideas as an instrument rather than a climax in philosophy. In the moral-social area, Crippa brings out some neglected facets. For instance, the aim of religious toleration is not only to achieve peace (that desperately sought goal of seventeenth-century thinkers and statesmen) but also to cultivate an atmosphere of friendship where men can discuss their religious differences and attend jointly to their social needs. The author also treats more seriously than usual Locke's declared aim of trying to convince the Socinians about the truth of Christ's divinity.

On all these issues, more detailed analyses are still required However, is it to Crippa's credit to raise them and thus force us to reconsider some evidence telling against the usual deistic portrait of Locke.

J. C.

Studies in Medieval Thought, I, 1958; II, 1959. **[Japanese text; summaries in English, French, or German.] Tokyo: Tokyo Univ., 1958, 1959. Vol. I, no price given; Vol. II, 300 yen.**

Studies in Medieval Thought is an annual publication of the Japanese Society of Medieval Philosophy. As the Society has grown in numbers, it has also increased the scope of its activities. The first two issues of this journal show an interest in all the basic problems of Thomistic philosophy, as well as more general articles and studies in other medieval thinkers such as Ockham, St. Augustine, and Siger of Brabant. In the first volume, there are three articles on St. Thomas's philosophy (on essence and existence, on ideas, on connaturality), two on St. Augustine (the meaning of *intellectus*, the light of nature and of grace), one on Siger of Brabant and his *Quaestiones in II et II De Anima*, and one on the recent work in medieval philosophy published by Germans. The second volume has six

articles on St. Thomas, five on St. Augustine, on each on St. Bonaventure and Ockham, and one on the medieval treatment of history. The level of these articles is remarkably high, and in general the approach is one that can be understood and followed easily.

G. P. K.

Le Travail selon saint Jean Chrysostome. **By Lucien Daloz. Paris: P. Lethielleux. Pp. viii + 194. Paper, Fr. 870.**

Is there a theology of labor in the writings of the Church Fathers? Following a careful rereading of the early Fathers, Daloz discovered in the "School of Antioch"—in the primacy it assigned to "practical" over "theoretical" wisdom—the elements and foundation of an economic theology.

Common to the Antiochian Fathers are the following "themes" isolated and found to be most fully developed in the homilies of Chrysostom: (1) God is a laborer who works unceasingly in caring for His creation (John, 5:17); (2) the image of God in man is neither his soul nor his reason but his *dominion* over the rest of creation (Genesis, 1:26); (3) man was made not to contemplate the world but to cultivate and improve it—the meaning of *Imitatio Dei* (Genesis, 2:15); (4) the Fall resulted from idle curiosity and man's failure to busy himself with the tasks assigned him; (5) God's purpose in expelling man from the Garden was to help him avoid idleness by compelling him to labor—such is the meaning of mortality; (6) anyone who displaces his punishment for original sin upon the shoulders of others, by making them labor toward his own support, violates the purpose of original punishment; and (7) the purpose of labor is not obedience to God but to provide the wherewithal to minister to the indigent and to those who cannot labor.

Besides these common "themes," Daloz also examines those that are peculiar to Chrysostom: (1) manual labor is a duty and a "law of nature" equally binding upon all (Acts, 20:33-35; I Thessalonians, 1:9, 4:11-12; II Thessalonians, 3:6-13; Ephesians, 4:28); (2) spiritual works consist—in their order of perfection—in giving away all that one has, in working with one's hands, in providing for the needs of others, and in receiving nothing to which one has not a right (Matt., 25:31-46; Luke, 18:18-22); (3) spiritual labor is pre-eminently the subordination of material labor to a moral purpose; and (4) the arts, properly speaking, consist of techniques helpful in maintaining life (which excludes the "fine arts"), the most important art being agriculture.

The value of a theology of labor should not be underestimated: accord-

ing to Daloz, it fulfills a vital function in making Christianity relevant to the labor movement and its struggle for social justice.

D. C. H.

L'Unité de l'homme et l'expérience qui la révèle d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin. **By Coloman Viola, S.J. Louvain: Home Universitaire "Cardinal Mindszenty," 1957. Pp. 47. Paper.**

The author studies the works of St. Thomas chronologically and finds a definite development in the assertion and explanation of the unity of man. In the early works, the unity of man is argued from vegetative and sensitive activity; intellection seems to be an activity of the soul alone in which the body shares only by presenting the object. The unity of man is expressed mostly by means of the doctrine of the unicity of form in a sensible substance. Beginning with the *Summa Theologiae* the act of intellection itself is asserted of the concrete subject, and the evidence for unity finds its final expression in the *Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima.* Here and in later works, the evidence is pointed in the expression "This man understands." Remembering that for St. Thomas "this man" is the singular demonstrable substance, we can see that the assertion amounts to saying, "This individual material thing (this body) understands." St. Thomas's way of arguing this fact is interesting; if, he says, your interlocutor denies this, he either understands his denial or not; in the second case, the argument is closed but not refuted; in the first case, he also is an instance of a singular sensible subject understanding. The author goes on to show how from this same experience St. Thomas draws his doctrine of the unity of man and the distinction of the soul from the body.

This brief study is important because it points out how St. Thomas became progressively more experiential in one of the crucial points of his philosophy (which is crucial for any philosophy): the nature of man himself.

G. P. K.

Wirklichkeit und Wirklichkeiten. Aufsätze und Vorträge. **By Wilhelm Weischedel. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1960. Pp. 286.**

This collection of articles and addresses has more unity than might be expected from other books of the same type. The author studied under Heidegger, and this influence is strongly noticeable throughout. Yet there are differences, both in style and content.

The papers are grouped into four groups. In the first appear four historical papers: on progress and error in Western philosophy, on Pascal and the limits of philosophy, on Voltaire and the problem of history, and on German philosophy between the two wars. The second group is the most profoundly philosophical and deals with metaphysics and philosophical theology. The first of six papers takes up the question, Is there a metaphysical experience? and answers it affirmatively, basing the analysis largely on the "questionability" of things and the self, where the influence of Heidegger is evident. In dealing with the "feeling of unreality" the author clearly distinguishes between reality as *Wirklichkeit* and as *Realität*. He uses this distinction to show that the modern problem is not epistemological (that is, "Might everything be a sheer fiction?") but "existential" (that is, "How do 'real' things get their 'reality-for-me'?"). He argues that this feeling is a necessary result of man's nature as reflective, that in becoming aware of the world and himself he necessarily becomes estranged from the world and from himself. He takes it that this estrangement is a fact and that this fact must be taken into account not only by philosophy but also—and perhaps even more—by theology. The problematic of faith that he uses is that of theologians like Barth, Bultmann, Gogarten; and this very fact shows something about his basic understanding of man in his world. Yet he is not simply a Barthian or simply a follower of Heidegger, for he does believe in the possibility of a philosophical theology (indeed, he promises a forthcoming book on this subject). His philosophical intuition thus seems somewhat culturally conditioned, though by no means thereby totally invalidated.

The third section deals with the place of art, especially contemporary art, in the life of man; and he questions, on basic human grounds, the humaneness of some movements in modern art. The fourth section has articles on ethical and cultural problems: conscience, the image of man, right and justice, the problem of the atom bomb. A Berliner has perhaps the best reasons for being disturbed about this problem!

This is an important book for metaphysicians, ethicians, and, in a somewhat indirect way, for theologians, As existentialist writings go, this book is remarkably easy to read, lacking the affected peculiarities of style and intellectual attitude that some writers seem to consider an infallible passport to profundity.

G. P. K.

Wunder. Eine Untersuchung über ihren Wirklichkeitswert. **By Georg Siegmund. Berlin: Morus-Verlag, 1958. Pp. 160. DM 13.50.**

This work is primarily a work of apologetics, inasmuch as it concerns itself with a consideration of the fact of miraculous occurrences. The central portion of the book deals with the miracle of Lourdes. However, one chapter, entitled "Miracles and Nature," deals with the meaning of the term "laws of nature," with the supposition of "unknown powers of nature," and with the notion that miracles would be "contrary" to nature. This chapter, though illuminating, is rather brief.

G. P. K.

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